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Note on Sources:
There is, surprisingly, little available in English on the reign of Alexander II,
therefore I rely primarily on the works of W.E. Mosse, N.G.O Pereira, and the collection
of works on Russia’s reform period edited by Ben Eklof. W.E. Mosse’s book Alexander
II and the Modernization of Russia, a secondary source, provides in-depth descriptions of
the problems facing Alexander II when he came into power, the process of his reforms,
descriptions of the reforms, and some of the consequences of those reforms including his
assassination in 1881. Similarly, N.G.O Pereira’s Tsar-Liberator: Alexander II of Russia
1818-1881 is a secondary source, describing some of his reforms, but focuses most
specifically on the process of the emancipation of the serfs, the emancipation itself and
the impact it had on the population. Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881 edited by Ben
Eklof, John Bushnell and Larissa Zakharova is a collection of secondary source essays on
the great reforms under Alexander II. Of these essays, the two I draw the most from are
“Autocracy and the Reforms of 1861-1874 in Russia” by Larissa Zakharova and “The
year of Jubilee” by Daniel Field. Zakharova provides in-depth information on the
reforms, including useful details not found in the other sources, such as the jury selection
process during the judicial reforms as well as a comprehensive discussion of the question
of a constitution. Field’s essay cites primary source material, providing examples of real
reactions by the public to the peasant reform and the other reforms in general. All three
sources together provide very thorough information about the specifics of the process of
reform, detailed information about the reforms themselves, and their consequences
(including a complete account of the tsar’s assassination).

3
On the other hand, there are arguably too many books about Mikhail Gorbachev,
many of which were dashed off to capitalize on the cachet of the glasnost era. The
majority of these are overly dramatic, subjective and repetitive. In consultation with my
advisor, I relied, therefore, on the most respected scholarly analyses of the Gorbachev
phenomenon: works written by Archie Brown, Zhores Medvedev, and Richard Sakwa,
whose accounts are detailed and reasonably free of bias and based on Russian language
sources.
Richard Sakwa’s book Gorbachev and His Reforms 1985-90 is a secondary
source that follows Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule from 1985 to 1990, beginning with his rise
to power and ending with a comprehensive review of perestroika and its effects. This
source focuses specifically on perestroika, glasnost, and the other major reforms, how
they were implemented, and how they impacted each part of Soviet society. This source
was extremely useful for my discussion on the reforms themselves and the immediate
consequences of those reforms, as well as difficulties in implementation. Though
Sakwa’s ends his analysis in 1990, one year before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
comprehensive review of the reforms and their effects for the years 1985 to 1990 is
invaluable.
I relied on two sources by Archie Brown, the leading scholar of the Gorbachev
era: The Gorbachev Factor and Seven Years that Changed the World. The Gorbachev
Factor is a secondary source that discusses the importance of Mikhail Gorbachev in the
transformation of the Soviet Union, not only in terms of his unique contributions in
different policy areas, but also regarding his political style and leadership. Seven Years
that Changed the World is a secondary source that looks back on the Gorbachev period to
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analyze the impact of perestroika on the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. It
describes the transformation of the Soviet state, the end of the Cold War, and the role of
Gorbachev in the dissolution. These sources perfectly compliment each other because
The Gorbachev Factor examines Gorbachev himself, his leadership style, and the
reforms, while Seven Years that Changed the World focuses on the reforms, the impact of
the reforms on the Soviet Union, and their part in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Both sources provide retroactive analyzes of Gorbachev, the reforms, and their
unintended consequences.
Gorbachev by Zhores A. Medvedev is a secondary source that includes detailed
discussion on Gorbachev’s leadership style, Gorbachev’s personal involvement in the
reform process, and the reforms themselves (particularly agricultural reforms). Medvedev
also provides in-depth information about the opposition to the reforms.
All of these sources together provide in depth analysis of the Gorbachev era, from
the reforms themselves to Gorbachev’s personal leadership style, relatively free of bias
and all based on Russian primary sources from the period.
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Introduction
A century separates Russia’s great reformers Alexander II and Mikhail
Gorbachev. Given that Western journalists often compared Gorbachev to Alexander II
while the former was in power, there is no serious scholarship that compares their
reforms in depth. Both rulers “failed” in the sense that their reforms destabilized society,
and in the case of Gorbachev, actually contributed to the end of the Soviet Union. Of
course, Alexander II did not have to face secession movements from the union republics.
However, apart from the “nationalities question,” there are many similarities between
these two eras of sweeping reforms, in terms of motivation, process, types of reforms,
and consequences. This thesis will evaluate these factors, starting with Alexander II and
the Great Reforms of the 1860s, followed by an assessment of Gorbachev’s “glasnost”
and “perestroika.” Finally, the significance of these case studies will be evaluated in the
context of Russia’s historic resistance to dramatic change.
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Part One: Alexander II
After three hundred years of oppressive autocratic rule, Alexander II determined
that in order to move his country forward, he would need to make consequential reforms
that challenged Russia and Russians in similar ways to the reforms of Peter the Great.
After the Russian army was badly defeated in the Crimean War, Alexander was forced to
take a hard look at the weaknesses in the Nicolaevan system to try to ensure that such a
humiliating defeat could never happen again.1 Russia’s failure in the Crimean War was
caused primarily by the backwardness of the Russian economy and the weakness of the
Russian army, which relied on serf soldiers.
When Alexander II came to power in 1855, the Russian economy was in
shambles, riddled with debt, and was not nearly developed enough to compete with
foreign opponents, particularly those in the West. The economy was almost exclusively
agricultural, while the West was industrializing and leaving Russia behind. Russia was
also facing a growing deficit. Between 1853 and 1858, the overall state deficit increased
from 52 million silver rubles to 307 million silver rubles, “the gold that backed paper
money decreased by more than half,” and the proportion of state revenues from liquor
farming rose to forty-three percent between 1853-1856.2 The state was on the brink of a
financial crisis, pushing the administration towards reform. Liquid assets in banks
decreased from 150 million rubles to 13 million rubles between 1857 and 1859.
Alexander himself wrote in a letter to his brother Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich

1

Larissa Zakharova, “Autocracy and the Reforms of 1861-1874 in Russia: Choosing Paths for
Development,” in Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881, ed. Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa
Zakharova (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 22.
2
Ibid.
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that he was extremely concerned by Russia’s financial situation, and that he planned “to
relieve it by any means possible.”3
Alexander’s motivations for sweeping change did not stem from the faltering
economy alone, but also from the “realization that the domestic political course
associated with the Nicolaevan system was in a state of crisis.”4 Power was highly
centralized in the hands of the tsar and the bureaucracy was corrupt and inefficient, as
was the judiciary. For the vast majority of Russians, “the law did not exist,” due to the
fact that the bureaucracy was staffed by corrupt government officials, who for the most
part cared more about profiting from their positions than implementing the law. 5 The
Russian army was also very weak by this time, clearly demonstrated by its almost
unprecedented defeat in the Crimean War. Alexander II knew he would need to
reorganize the military so it could “fight on equal terms with a European coalition.”6
However, Alexander believed that the modernization of the military, like the
economy, was impossible without the abolition of serfdom. Serfdom in Russia was not
economy sustainable, even without considering the moral arguments against it. The
subjection of more than about 40 million people, owned by individuals (serfs) and the
state (state peasants), to the arbitrary and essentially unchecked power of their masters.
Serfs could be forced to perform any kind of work, traded, sold, mortgaged, or drafted
into the army. Families could be broken up, and some serfs suffered physical or sexual

3

Ibid.
Ibid., 21.
5 W.E. Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966),
23.
6 Alfred Rieber, The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to Prince A.I. Bariatinskii, 1857-1864
(Paris: Mouton & Co, 1966), 24.
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abuse. Laws limiting the nobility’s power were vague and rarely enforced. They exacted
dues from their serfs, in cash (obrok) and in labor (barshchina).
The tsar and his Minister of Defense, Dmitrii Miliutin, also wanted a large reserve
force instead of a costly peacetime active duty military. However, the serf population
could not be entrusted with military training and then allowed to return to their villages as
part of this reserve, for the risk of rebellion or revolution was too great. If the serfs were
emancipated, however, they theoretically could be trusted to be part of this reserve force.
Another key aspect of serfdom was the concept of ascription, which meant that a
serf could travel away from home to work in a factory (for example), but only with the
written permission of their master, and they were still required to pay their share of taxes
and dues to the landowner back home. Generally serfs were subjected to local laws (as
distinct from the laws of the empire), had almost no personal freedom, and, except in
unusual circumstances, could not prosper. Millions of people were tied to the land and
owned by the nobility or the state, and therefore the state could not push forward with
industrialization because they did not have the free labor source necessary for industrial
growth and advancement. As a result, the abolition of serfdom became the centerpiece of
the Great Reform Era.

Serfdom/Emancipation of the Serfs
Alexander II believed that the most important reform he needed to enact was the
abolition of serfdom. He knew that there was no way the country could modernize
economically and compete on a global scale if 40 million Russians were little more than
slaves. In order to modernize the economy to Western standards, the country needed a
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free labor force, not a compulsory labor force. Alexander felt that emancipation, by
decree would not work if it were not also supported by the nobility.7
The abolition of serfdom began with a secret committee meeting in the Winter
Palace in 1857, which sought to expand on past decrees on the subject of agriculture and
peasants. The rescript of November 20, 1857 to Vilnius’s Governor-General V.I.
Nazimov revealed two contrasting solutions to the peasant question that had been
instituted in the past in limited locales.8 The first was a reform regulating peasant land
allotments and work obligations implemented in the southwest in 1848 and the other was
the emancipation of the peasants in the three Baltic provinces in 1816-1819. The rescript
demonstrated that the government planned to combine the two: “the squires would retain
a property right to all their land; peasants would gain the right to redeem only their
household plots and the right to cultivate allotments of plow land in exchange for dues;
the squire would retain his manorial authority.”9 The government distributed this rescript
throughout European Russia, making it seem as though it was a noble initiative that the
nobility could support. Though the nobility was in fact hostile to the reform, the
government pressured them to “come forward with an ‘initiative’ in favor of the
application of the rescripts nationwide.”10
In 1858 and the first half of 1859, forty-six provincial committees of the nobility
(and two interprovincial commissions) convened, representing “a new device in the
history of reform.”11 The members of these committees came from various generations
and sociopolitical groups, such as “amnestied Decembrists and Petrashevsky, Slavophiles
7

Rieber, 38.
Zakharova, 24.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
8
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and Westernizers, and both partisans and opponents of the abolition of serfdom.”12 As the
committees started working, divisions within the nobility became apparent with a liberal
minority and a conservative or reactionary majority in almost every committee.
Alexander had made it clear to the committees that the peasants needed to feel there had
been a definite improvement in their lot, but at the same time ensure the interests of the
landowners were safeguarded. The tsar further declared that all the committees needed to
submit, along with their projects, detailed information on exactly how the peasants’ lives
would be improved by their proposals.
The government waited as “bitter battles were raging among the members” of the
committees across the provinces, and closely scrutinized public opinion, including the
nobility, the peasantry, and the press.13 From 1857 to 1861, the Minister of Internal
Affairs Sergey Lanskoy was required by Alexander II to submit weekly reports on the
mood of the nobility and the peasantry, “on ‘rumors’ and ‘gossip’ in the provinces, on the
activities of the provincial committees, and- this was a compulsory element- on all
instances of peasant upheaval.”14 Liberals such as A.I. Koshelev, A.M. Unkovskii, and
V.A. Cherkasskii took the lead on opening committee sessions to the public. They also
shared “lithograph journals of their proceedings” with the public and the press.15
The reform itself was met with opposition both within the commission and
without, such as deputies from the provinces. Opposition came from liberals,
conservatives, reactionaries, and others who were against the reforms, but for different
reasons. Some opposed the redemption of the plowing land by the peasants, the abolition
12

Zakharov 25.
Mosse, 54.
14 Zakharova, 25.
15 Ibid.
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of manorial power, and the concept of peasant self-administration. Others favored the
redemption but felt sweeping reforms of the local administration were needed as well.
Nikolai Miliutin headed a group of liberal bureaucrats who hoped the outcome of the
reform would be the abolition of the nobles’ manorial power, the incorporation of
peasants into public life, and “the conversion of the peasants into the owners of their
allotments.”16 All sides, however, opposed the larger role the state would be given by the
reforms, both in the countryside and in social and economic affairs generally. This
divisiveness within the provincial committees did not stop the reform from occurring, but
it led to significant delays and modifications of the commission’s draft, to the point
where no side was satisfied. For example, land allotments were cut back by twenty
percent and dues were increased, which made redemption more costly and a true burden
on the peasants (but profitable for the state). While the committees hoped to avoid
bringing much of the peasantry to ruin by the reform, that possibility “loomed larger and
became inevitable.”17
Grand Duke Konstantin, the Tsar’s brother and a steady supporter of the liberal
cause, was tasked with mediating among the many sides to reach an actual solution. Of
all opposing viewpoints, three main groups persisted. The extreme “planters,” led by
Prince Pavel Pavlovich Gagarin, wanted to keep all the land in the hands of the gentry.
The liberals, led by S.S. Lanskoy and Count D.N. Budov, often sided with the peasants
and favored more sweeping reforms. The last group, led by Count Michael Muraviev,
included people who simply wanted to “save for their order the maximum of material

16
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advantage.”18 These divisions within the committees led to two or three different projects
being proposed, instead of the single proposal requested. As a result, there were many
delays, making the task of the sub-committee set up to examine them even more difficult.
In February 1859, Alexander approved the suggestion to turn the sub-committee into two
separate commissions in an attempt to increase efficiency. Nevertheless, arguments
continued in the main commission, most often about the amount of land serfs should be
allotted; the provincial committees continued to present one liberal and one conservative
proposal because they were not able to agree.
In summer 1859, Alexander declared that the provincial committees would now
focus only on how the emancipation would be applied locally, as the fundamental
principles of the reform were settled and not subject to change.19 At this point committee
discussions were restricted, along with the number of deputies sent to represent them in
the capital. Although the deputies who had been called to the capital complained and
requested a meeting with the tsar, they were told they must “limit their discussions to the
best manner of applying these principles in their respective localities” and were not to
discuss the main principles of liberation.20 Alexander told the assembled deputies on
September 16 that he hoped “this great work to be accomplished in a manner not hurtful
to anyone and satisfactory to all.”21 Unfortunately this was an impossible task, as the
peasants believed the land they toiled rightfully belonged to them, and the nobles also

18

Mosse, 54.
Ibid., 57.
20 Ibid., 58.
21 Mosse, 58.
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claimed the land for themselves, making it “absolutely certain from the start that there
could be no solution satisfactory to both the main classes of Russian society.”22
Tensions continued to rise between the deputies representing the provincial
committees and the main commission, and many deputies appealed to the Tsar himself,
declaring their disappointment with the commission’s proposals. Even the liberal
minority believed what was proposed was unacceptable, as they thought it would ruin
landowners without helping the peasants. The liberals proposed different ideas, such as
the immediate transfer of land to the peasants and the creation of an elective national
assembly. This, however, the tsar would not accept, and all deputies received official
reprimands and were dispersed.23 This meeting of the first group of deputies
demonstrated some of the fundamental problems facing Alexander. Throughout the
emancipation reform deliberations, “he had spared no effort to enlist the cooperation of
the gentry” and had tried to encourage them to take an active role in the process. Though
he yearned for the support and consent of the nobility, “he had never been able to permit
real freedom of discussion.”24 The majority of the deputies were opposed to a landed
emancipation, as were the majorities in the provincial committees. The liberal minorities,
however, went even beyond freedom with land, going “farther in their sympathy for the
peasants than appeared practicable to the government,” calling for a diverse array of farreaching reforms in all aspects of Russian public life.25 Thus Alexander’s wish for
discussion and noble participation in the process of the emancipation process ultimately

22

Mosse, 59.
Ibid., 60.
24 Ibid.
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delayed the reform, forcing him to reject many of the proposals brought before him for
consideration.
After changes in appointments to the Editing Commission in July 1860,
commission members began the codification of the new law, with a deadline of October
22, 1860. Next the proposal had to be passed to the Main Committee and, finally,
discussed in the Imperial Council. In the Imperial Council Alexander tried to hasten the
process, as it had now been going on for four years. He also tried to impress upon the
members of the Council the importance of improving the situation of the serfs, because
he believed “the abolition of serfdom was vital to the future strength of Russia.”26 The
Council began discussing the “one-thousand-odd sections of the statute,” an enormous
task that continued to produce opposing opinions on certain sections for some and on the
very concept of liberation for others. The tsar often sided with the majority in disputes,
and in an attempt to speed up the process, allowed for a final reduction in the maximum
size of land allotments.27 He also permitted the introduction of a pauper’s allotment. This
pauper’s allotment would be “a quarter of the legal maximum for any given province,”
allocated with no redemption fee attached.
The liberal bureaucrats found themselves trying to abolish serfdom, while
working for an absolutist state based on serfdom. Of the obstacles they faced, arguably
the most restrictive was “Alexander II’s refusal to permit the peasants to redeem their
plow lands without the assent of the landowner, not to mention his unwavering
attachment to his prerogatives as monarch.”28 The plan’s stages were: 1) the personal

26
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emancipation of the peasants, 2) temporary obligation to the state, and 3) the final
transition to redemption. The right of the peasants to use their land allotments of land was
intended to be perpetual, with their repayment of the required dues and redemption “their
only escape from the net in which the state had so tightly enmeshed them.”29
Serfdom was officially abolished March 3, 1861, followed by reforms for the
appanage peasants in 1863 and the state peasants in 1866. The serfs received the full
rights of free rural inhabitants. Nobles retained their property rights, but they had to grant
the use of specified allotments to the peasants “in return for a specified obligation.” The
peasants had the right, with the consent of the nobles, to acquire full ownership of the
land once they were freed of their obligations.
Although the reform favored the nobility, no one was satisfied. The nobles lost a
third of their land, and the land given to the peasant communes was much less than what
the peasants had lived on before. The nobility also decided what land went to the
commune, which led to the peasants receiving land that was difficult to farm (such as
swamp land or infertile fields). The emancipation allowed a two-year transition period
before the reforms were actually put into effect, except for household serfs, who received
immediate personal freedom, but no land. 30 Nevertheless, the emancipation proved very
costly for the government, because it owned the peasants’ debt. During Mikhail
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Reitern’s31 term as Minister of Finance (1862-78) “the size of the state debt increased by
3,000 million rubles.”32

Emancipation of the Serfs: Implementation and Effects
The public reception of the emancipation reforms varied. While the government
expected jubilation and excitement from the peasants over the emancipation, this was
rarely the case. Historian Daniel Field’s article “Year of Jubilee” describes in detail an
encounter between the government officials bringing news of the emancipation and the
peasants in the Kaluga Province. 33 In 1861, the governor of Kaluga Province sent 167
officials as “heralds of liberty” to the districts of the provinces to read the relevant
sections of the reform to the peasants. The peasants were “polite but exhibited
‘astonishing restraint.’” He describes the men as worrying about how much land they
would receive and the terms under which they would hold it. When the allotments and
dues were explained, “the men mumbled vaguely and wandered off.”34 The peasant
women seemed cautious but pleased, however, especially as the nobles’ rights to fruit,
mushrooms, fowl, etc. from the serfs was now abolished. The peasant woman Luker’ia
serves to exemplify the joy some felt at the outset of the emancipation, supposedly giving
the finger in the direction of the manor house and shouting “Now I’m free!” 35

31

M. Kh. Reitern is either spelled Reitern or Reutern depending on the source, therefore for continuity he
will be referred to as Reitern in this work.
32 Peter Gatrell, “The Meaning of the Great Reforms in Russian Economic History,” in Russia’s Great
Reforms, 1855-1881, ed. Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1994), 97.
33
Daniel Field, “The Year of Jubilee,” in Russia’s Great Reforms, 40-57.
34 Field, 40.
35 Ibid.
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Though the emancipation reform was imperfect and difficult to implement, it was
nevertheless a law that freed over millions from bondage.36 A major problem with
implementation, however, was that the government did not give the peasants an
explanation of the reform that they could understand, especially the stages involved. For
example, some took the idea of a two-year transition period to mean that if they remained
working for the landowner during the two-year transition period, they would be given
land for free, without redemption payments, once it was over. Rumors that this was not
the “real” emancipation spread quickly, and often the officials tasked with explaining it
were met with hostility. Many communes refused to sign the reform; by January 1862,
about 3% of the total charters required for the empire had been signed. A year later, only
two-thirds of the total required had been signed.37
Another misunderstanding was that the peasants had their own conception of
property ownership. Many peasants firmly believed that the land they tilled was theirs,
although they thought it was the property of God or the tsar. For the peasants, the idea
that they had to pay for their land “was a greater outrage to justice than serfdom itself.”
This “outrage” was the basis for much of the tension between ex-serfs and government
officials, as well as nobles, in 1861.38 It also became apparent that it was almost
impossible to sell one’s allotment, and impossible to free oneself from the debt that this
land now entailed. By 1880, “only half of one percent of the ex-serfs” had managed to
detach themselves from the commune. Though most peasants did not want to leave the
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commune or their land, the concept of getting a “fresh start” and doing something new
elsewhere was essentially impossible for those mainly younger peasants who wanted it.
Though the abolition of serfdom was momentous as a moral act, the reality was
that peasant life was still bleak. The process designed to stabilize the reforms was “loose
and weak,” while autocratic power remained untouched. The emancipation did not solve
the land question, but tied the peasants to the state instead of the nobility, leaving both the
peasants and the nobles equally dissatisfied. The statutes and administrative actions “all
discriminated against peasants, circumscribed their geographical and occupational
mobility, and imposed fiscal and economic burdens upon them.”39 For example, in the
north, allotments of land were large but expensive, whereas in the south, the land was too
valuable to give up to the peasants, so the allotments were much smaller. The
compromises intended to satisfy the nobles meant that now many peasants could not
make ends meet “relying solely on the output of their household plots and allotments,”
either because their allotment of land was too small, or because too much of what they
produced had to go to redemption payments.40
The reason the redemption payments placed such a burden on the ex-serfs was
that often these payments “were calculated according to an inflated value of the land and
bore no relation to current market values.”41 The redemption payments therefore led to
“the accumulation of substantial arrears.”42 Forms of sharecropping emerged between exserfs and their former owners. In some cases, labor contracts were written “in return for
the legal right of access to the lord’s land,” such as forests and rivers for hunting and
39
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fishing. Many ex-serfs felt this to be an inescapable restoration of “servile relations”
between ex-serfs and former serf owners, providing a clear example that elements of
serfdom survived, despite the emancipation. Not only did the ex-serfs have to pay back
the redemption costs, they also had to pay local and central government taxes.43 Though
many peasants were indebted to the state, there was a sense of security in the fact that
their land could not be taken away.44 Household serfs, who made up about seven percent
of the serf population, were “not usually entitled to allotments of plow land,” and though
free of redemption fees, were left less much secure than other serfs.
The liberation of the serfs aided prosperous peasants but led to the further decline
of poorer peasants.45 As for the nobility, they lost land, income, and labor, as well as
status. In Field’s essay “Year of Jubilee,” N.V. Sakharov, one of the many officials sent
to the countryside to announce the emancipation, recounts a noblewoman crying,
shouting that they had once had everything and now they had nothing, expressing general
anger over the news of the emancipation.46 Although the arbitrary power of the
landowner ended with the emancipation, peasants still found themselves subjected to the
nobles as a class. Nobles continued to dominate local government and administration,
including the agencies charged with implementing the emancipation. Many ex-serfs were
forced to turn to the nobility “as renters or wage laborers or sharecroppers” in order to
survive, again placing the peasant in the subservient/submissive role in society.47 The
characteristics of the servile economy survived the abolition of serfdom, in the form of
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sharecropping and other types of agreements similar to barshchina (labor dues). Even
after the abolition of serfdom, peasants were still ascribed, but to the village commune
instead of to a master. The commune regulated the comings and goings of peasants, and
peasants who left to work in factories or trade were still obligated to send part of their
earnings back to the commune. However, freedom of movement for the peasant, despite
the need for permission to travel, grew substantially after the abolition of serfdom.
While there were moral and military reasons for the emancipation, its foremost
purpose was for economic modernization, and to maximize growth and prosperity, which
serfdom had impeded. Yet the extent to which the peasants became “modern” citizens of
the empire is debatable. Russia remained rigidly hierarchical. Though serfs became “free
rural inhabitants,” they were subject to the vagaries of local law, rather than national law,
and though they could serve on juries after the judicial reform of 1864, the “property
qualifications for jury service excluded all but a few rich peasants.”48 The social tension
between freed serfs and the gentry was ever present, and the serfs were still tied to the
land due to the taxes demanded by the state and the redemption fees (which had to be
paid off over 49 years). The redemption fees and taxes that kept the serfs tied to the land
meant that the free labor force the tsar desired did not emerge.

Censorship Reform
In order to promote the growth of culture and the flourishing of ideas within the
general populace, in contrast to Nicholas I, Alexander II knew to relax controls. For
example, passports for travel abroad were freely issued, causing the number of people
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who traveled abroad to increase 4.5 times from 1856 to 1859. In August 1856, amnesty
was declared for political prisoners, such as “surviving Decembrists, Petrashevtsy, and
participants in the Polish insurrection of 1831,” a total of nine thousand people.49 The
most important manifestation of cultural relaxation was the censorship reform.
In spring 1865 Alexander II passed new censorship laws, which would remain in
place for forty years.50 This included the removal of preliminary censorship, foreign
works were now permitted in universities without being censored by the state, and any
violations of censorship norms were now dealt with in a public jury trial.51 Under
Nicholas I, censorship had been oppressive, keeping the public in the dark about all
government activities and stifling intellectual discussion. Books were banned, publishing
companies shut down, and a central censorship committee was created to “supervise” the
education of youth, observe internal security, and “promote support for the policies of the
government.”52 Alexander II, on the other hand, wanted to promote critical thinking in
Russia and also make the workings of the government more transparent to the people
than it had ever been (e.g. publishing the public budget each year).
In May 1862 radical pamphlets titled Young Russia circulated St. Petersburg.
These demanded elective national and provincial assemblies, elected judges, publicly
owned factories, universal education, the abolition of marriage, and the dissolution of
monasteries.53 A special commission was set up to find the authors of these pamphlets, as
well as members of secret revolutionary organizations. The first political trial since
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Nicholas I was the trial of poet M.I. Mikhailov, who was arrested as the “reputed author
of one of the clandestine handbills” circulating St. Petersburg and sentenced to penal
servitude in Siberia.54 This trial symbolized a shift in Alexander’s political policies.
Leading radical journals were suspended, and Nikolai Chernyshevsky, who edited one of
them, was arrested in 1861 along with other journalists.55 Chernyshevsky was brought to
trial as one of the editors of the radical journals, and sentenced to fourteen years of hard
labor in Siberia and then life in exile.
Alexander’s censorship reform certainly promoted critical thinking, and the new
freedom of publication and public intellectual debate sparked a flourishing of culture, but
also the growth of revolutionary movements. One of the unintended consequences of the
censorship reforms was that revolutionaries were now able to spread their message to the
public, and the encouragement of critical thinking led to the questioning of the autocracy
itself. This was politically destabilizing; ultimately Alexander II tried to pull back on
these reforms because of the dangers such changes posed to autocratic power, but he
could not stop the flow of ideas, particularly revolutionary ones, once Pandora’s box had
been opened.

Zemstvo Reform
Due to the abolition of the nobility’s manorial power and new civil rights for the
peasantry, local government had to be reformed. The new administrative institution was
called the zemstvo. The process began with local committees submitting projects for the
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reform of local self-government to a main committee and an editing commission.56 As
with the Emancipation process, members of these committees disagreed on much. In the
main committee, some members believed the nobility should manage local affairs, while
the others argued that all social groups should participate equally. P.A. Valuiev, who
became Minister of the Interior in 1861, favored the nobility, hoping to reserve the
greatest influence in local affairs for the nobility, place the zemstvos under control of the
Ministry of the Interior, and allow the zemstvos to deal with economic issues alone.
Reformers like Nikolai Miliutin and Mikhail Reitern attacked many principles in
Valuiev’s draft, and the struggle between the liberals and conservatives continued within
both the commission and the Imperial Council. Alexander finally signed the zemstvo
statute in January 1864. The statute kept many of Valuiev’s original principles as a form
of “consolation prize offered to the nobility for the losses of 1861.”57
The zemstvos had two levels: district and provincial. The goal of the zemstvos
originally was to allow the people to participate in the administration of local affairs. The
zemstvos met each year for short sessions, where they debated and voted on a budget,
discussed outlines of their work, and decided on future policy. Members were elected by
three groups of electors. These groups were based on property qualifications: the first
group was the landowners; the second, townsmen; and the last, peasants (who voted
indirectly). The size of each zemstvo was fixed and although the landowners held a
majority, it was not an absolute majority.
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In the first zemstvo elections, the gentry was 42% of the electorate; the clergy,
6%; merchants, 10%; and peasants, 38%.58 59 Members of the district zemstvos elected
the provincial zemstvos, which focused on “matters affecting a whole province.”60 Due to
the skewing of the electorate, provincial assemblies consisted of 74% nobles and
bureaucrats, 4% clergy, 11% merchants, and 11% peasants.61 The peasant representation
in the zemstvos was wildly disproportionate to numbers of peasants in the population, at
least 80%, in favor of the landowning nobles who composed a small fraction, about 2%.
The zemstvos nevertheless provided the first real opportunity for the peasants to
participate in public affairs and administration. After 1873, the zemstvos were “given the
right to make legally binding by-laws” relating to local issues, such as sanitation or fire
prevention.62 While they did not succeed in becoming fully autonomous, they did provide
health care and education to rural districts and improved the conditions of hospitals,
asylums, and other public institutions. Their role in fire prevention in the countryside had
a positive impact on the lives of the peasants. The zemstvos also improved elementary
education; in 1856 there were only around 8,000 primary schools in the entire country,
but by 1880, there were over 23,000 (the majority of which were funded by the
zemstvos).63
The creation of the zemstvo allowed the peasants a degree of political
participation that had not existed before. Their right to vote moved them one step closer
to social and political modernization. While they were many degrees removed from the
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political power of the nobility and the state, Alexander had given the peasant elite new
ideas about their place in society.

1870 Municipal Government Reform
There was a similar law for municipalities, intended to create “urban selfadministration on the same principles” as the zemstvos.64 The municipal statute of 1870
created an elective town council (duma) in all towns, similar in status and function to the
zemstvos. Until the early 1870s, the City Charter of Catherine II (1785) was the primary
legal document regulating municipal administration. However, by the 1870s, the Charter
“no longer reflected the actual level of urban social and economic development.”65 City
administrations had no elected members; instead, “administrative duties were performed
by assemblies of the ‘urban elite,’” and commoners were generally banned from
participating in public affairs. In response to petitions, the Ministry of the Interior
decided to tackle city reform and formed a committee, which, taking public opinion into
account, “authorized the creation of special city commissions made up of local
bureaucrats and representatives of the urban population.”66 After eight years of discussion
and drafts, the ministry approved the measure in 1870. As a result of continuous revision
to meet the objections of the elite, the statute was much more conservative than originally
intended. While the first draft bore similarities to the reforms of the early 1860s, the final
draft had very few. However, the municipal reforms succeeded in taking administrative
responsibilities out of the hands of the “urban elite” and into the hands of a representative
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body (the Duma).67 The number of delegates was based on the number of voters in the
city, but voting rights were restricted to property owners and legal entities; this provision
excluded many members of society such as hired laborers, teachers, and physicians.68
The dumas had the same difficulty in achieving full autonomy as the zemstvos;
they had a “lack of control over the police, an elective system copied from Prussia, but
alien to Russian municipal traditions, based on three electoral groups with a few wealthy
citizens enrolled in the first, the bulk of the poorer in the third.”69 Despite these
drawbacks, the dumas still “did much to revive Russian local life.”70 Networks of
municipal services were created in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Their tasks included
taking care of the water supply, paving roads, improving hospitals, and even running
slaughterhouses. Smaller towns provided other services based on the needs of that town.
Healthcare improved as the number of hospitals increased and their quality improved.
Like the zemstvos, the dumas had responsibility for primary education as well, and often
formed committees to supervise the municipal schools.71 The number of municipal
schools grew dramatically in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as in cities like Kiev
and Chernigov. In fact, from 1873 to 1880, the number of municipal schools in St.
Petersburg rose from sixteen to eighty-eight. The budget devoted to primary education
also rose sharply during the reform era.
Local government reform was meant to make local government more efficient
and aid the transition brought about by the emancipation. The zemstvos improved health
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care in villages and towns “wonderfully,”72 and they gave the peasants their first taste of
political participation. The municipal dumas woke Russian towns “from the profound
slumber into which they had plunged in the reign of Nicholas.”73 However this newfound
freedom also had unintended consequences as it further destabilized the already unstable
countryside, and like many of the other reforms, threatened the power of the autocracy.

Education Reform
Educational reform under Alexander II targeted universities as well as primary
schools. A state system of primary schools was established, and for the first time in
Russian history primary education was free and secularized. In this new system,
competition for spots in high schools were made equal among the castes, no longer
allowing preferential treatment for the children of the elite.
The process for the reform of the university education system, however, began in
spring 1861 when the Council of Ministers considered the state of the universities, which
many conservative ministers wished to close for “reorganization.”74 Though the tsar
refused, Admiral Y.V. Putiatin, a rigid disciplinarian, replaced the liberal Minister of
Education M.M. Kovalevskii. He introduced new regulations, which led to student
protests; in response, all lectures were suspended, and St. Petersburg University was
closed. Protests continued to escalate until the Governor-General called out troops to
quiet the situation. Meetings continued, and about 300 students were arrested.
Demonstrations occurred in many other higher education institutions across the empire to
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support the protestors. Tsar Alexander stepped in, relieved the Governor-General of his
duties, saying that he did not approve of students being arrested. However, St. Petersburg
University remained closed until a “new statute for all Russian universities” could be
created.75
The University Statute of 1863 declared that a Rector, elected every four years
from among the professors of that university, would head each university. The university
administration was to be run by a council composed of the professors themselves. They
were to appoint and train new professors, open new institutions, and scholarly inquiries
and missions abroad were encouraged.76 The ministry promoted university autonomy of
at first, which had been limited under Nicholas I, and now controlled their own
curricula.77 Student regulations were also relaxed; now study abroad, which had been
banned under Nicholas I, was allowed.78
From 1863 to 1880, the Russian university system saw a phase of rapid
development. Alexander II’s education reforms were meant to modernize the educational
system by extending education to the peasants, which would create a well-educated work
force to modernize the Russian economy. The educational reform did succeed by
providing basic education for all people, regardless of caste. However, literacy did not
spread as quickly as Alexander II had hoped because peasants wanted their children in
the fields. It did, however, introduce the principle of equal opportunity to Russia.
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This newfound freedom and education also had some unintended consequences,
such as sparking student protests for more concessions. Alexander answered these with
the “May Regulations,” which led to more unrest. Incendiary ideas could now spread
quickly throughout the country, including rural villages. As early as 1862, major sectors
of society were discontented and it seemed the country would be plunged into chaos; it
began with unrest among university students in Kiev that later spread to other schools.
Alexander ignored these “breaches of discipline,” refusing to close Kiev University, but
this only encouraged more disorder and led to organized student demonstrations against
the government. In 1861, a series of illegal proclamations were circulated in St.
Petersburg, urging the educated classes to seize power from the government. The
pamphlets also started calling for a constituent assembly, a constitution, and general
social transformation. The struggle between the government and the university students
ultimately led to Alexander’s administration attempting to withdraw many of these
reforms.

Economic Reform
Russia’s traditional economy was a major impediment to change, but Alexander
believed these obstacles had to be overcome, given that the empire’s underdevelopment
had been a major factor in the devastating loss in the Crimean War. The tsar attempted to
modernize Russia’s economy through a number of financial reforms, the first of which
was aimed at the poorest members of society, the serfs. He pardoned 40 million rubles in
tax arrears and gave tax exemptions to regions “severely hit” by the Crimean war.79 The
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real process of reform, however, began when Mikhail Reitern was appointed Minister of
Finance, charged with carrying out Alexander’s economic reforms. Before 1862, many
important sources of revenue “had been administered independently by various
government departments.”80 He centralized accounts and revenue sources, improved audit
methods, and after 1862 began publishing the budget each year as an attempt to promote
transparency in the relationship between the state and the people.81 His technical reforms
sought to improve and develop the economic life of the empire, which he believed could
be found in railway construction.
Reitern devoted time and resources to railway building, specifically in “the
encouragement of railway building by private companies.”82 Government assistance to
the private sector, especially in iron, steel, and engineering companies, helped those
industries to expand and therefore contributed to the speedy completion of the railway
projects. When Alexander came to the throne, Russia had only about 660 miles of
railway. At the time of the tsar’s assassination in 1881, the empire had approximately
14,000 miles of railway. The major objective of this construction was to facilitate the
export of grain, which was achieved. Between 1861 and 1865, the average annual export
of grain was about 2.7 billion pounds, by 1880 it had risen to an annual average of about
9.3 billion pounds.83 The construction of railways not only increased grain exports, but
also allowed for the general expansion of Russian exports and imports in the 1860s and
1870s. Russia began to “import rails, locomotives, and other capital goods on a larger
scale” through the use of the railways, however this ultimately led to a “sustained trade
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deficit during the late 1860s and early 1870s.”84 Large-scale enterprises increased their
output during this period as well. The output per person between 1845 and 1855
increased by 25 percent, while between 1855 and 1863 output per person increased by 85
percent. In general, foreign trade increased during the reform era, particularly an
“increase in European demand for Russian grain,” due to the railways, lower duties, and
the liberalization of trade in Europe during this time period. Duties were reduced in 1850,
1857, and 1868.85 The new railways also allowed for more efficient supply and transport
chains, and were used to transport troops as well as military supplies.86
In 1864, Russia’s first commercial bank was created. The government played a
large role in its creation, as it provided “up to half of the foundation capital,” and other
financial institutions quickly followed.87 The government continued to encourage banks
to start and grow, and towards the end of Alexander’s reign, Russia not only had 278
municipal banks, but also 33 joint stock commercial banks. There were societies for
mutual credit, loan and savings associations, and a huge growth in joint-stock companies.
Although the State Bank maintained its important role in Russian finances, the creation of
private banks and other financial institutions during this period helped lay the foundation
for commercial and industrial expansion.88 This growth in banking during the reform
period “increased the importance of capitalist entrepreneurs.”89
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At the same time, the expansion of large-scale production and industry caused the
ranks of the industrial proletariat to grow. However, the state bank was not established to
extend credit for economic development to prospective entrepreneurs, but instead was
used to provide low interest loans to the government, lower inflation on paper currency,
and to “retire part of the national debt.”90 The construction of the railways stimulated
growth in Russian industry.91 The new railway systems promoted the trade and export of
Russian grain through the Baltic and Black Sea ports, and allowed for easier
transportation of troops to the south and west.92 The economic reforms were meant to
modernize the economy, and along with the emancipation, to increase prosperity,
productivity, and the wealth of the country in general (especially because Russia was
severely indebted). While the economic reforms certainly laid the path for rapid
economic growth, development, and modernization particularly in industry and advanced
finance, the reforms did not cause the immediate growth in the economy Alexander II
was expecting.93 It also did not significantly improve people’s lives (which was one of the
original goals of the reforms), due to the destabilizing nature of the emancipation, which
went hand in hand with these economic reforms.

Military Reform
The backwardness of the Russian military and failure to modernize proved to be
disastrous in the Crimean War. Alexander and his government knew that military reform
was necessary to avoid another international embarrassment. Dmitrii Miliutin was
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appointed Minister of War in 1861, and the military draft was suspended for three years
to allow time for the reforms to be developed and implemented. During his tenure,
Miliutin introduced a series of reforms in the hopes of modernizing and improving the
Russian military. He believed that with the education of soldiers, and a reduction in
military cruelty, the army would not only become more technologically advanced but
would generally be more effective, as the troops would not fight out of fear.
Miliutin began to abolish the more barbaric forms of corporal punishment meted
out to soldiers, such as flogging and branding. Miliutin also suggested length of service
be reduced to eight years, although he would have preferred a shorter term because he
wanted to create a small peacetime force and large reserve. His ultimate goal was to have
a reserve army that could be called upon when needed. He believed soldiers needed
training in adapting to terrain instead of parade marching, that they needed rifled
weapons, and that the supply system needed to be updated. He also wanted to reform the
military education system, and in particular pushed for a curriculum that included
instruction in reading and writing. Alexander approved his plan, which “served as the
blueprint for Miliutin’s activity until his retirement in 1881.”94
In 1859, Miliutin succeeded in reducing the term of military service from twentyfive to sixteen years, the Military Code was revised, punishments were reduced, and he
abolished the practice of using military service as a form of civil punishment. Sailors’
and soldiers’ sons were released from obligatory service; they became free taxpaying
citizens, and the category of military cantonists and all military colonies were abolished.
In addition, basic education (such as reading and arithmetic) was now given to all
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draftees, including peasants.95 A new statute abolished the crueler, more barbaric forms of
punishment in 1863, an act that “completely altered the spirit of the Russian army and
navy.”96 The procedure within military courts was modernized to make it resemble the
form of civil courts established in 1864, military engineering was improved, and “the
construction of strategic railways was sped up.”97
The military justice system had been similar to the pre-reform civilian justice
system, and provided no provision for defense counsel. Commanders in the military
courts had the authority to reduce or raise sentences the courts dispensed, with no
oversight. In 1867, the reformed military justice system was codified, including courts for
appeals and proposed changes to punishments. The tsar himself appointed the judges at
the higher levels of the system.98 Administrative changes improved military efficiency,
such as the modernization of weapons, equipment, and military schooling. The former
cadet schools had focused on purely military instruction. Miliutin organized the new
schools like their civilian counterparts, with military instruction added to a regular
curriculum. This meant that as soldiers began to be taught to read and write, and receive a
general education, they were able to achieve a higher level of skill in regards to military
technology and training than soldiers in the past.99 Miliutin continued to push for literacy
programs, which finally became mandatory in 1875 (though it only lasted until 1880).
Miliutin’s introduction of conscription was a step towards social equity, at least in
terms of military service. Before conscription reform, only the taxpayers were required to
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perform military service, namely the peasants and the lower middle class. Miliutin
formed a commission in 1863 to prepare a new statute on military service. Nobles and
wealthy merchants fiercely opposed this reform, because in the past their status had
shielded their sons from military service. This noble opposition delayed implementation
of the reform, but finally, on January 1, 1874, Alexander signed Miliutin’s statute on
military service; now all men could be conscripted for military service after the age of
twenty, and military service was reduced to six years. 100 Though there was a reduction in
service for those who were highly educated, this was still a step toward a form of social
equality among the classes. The days of buying exemptions were over.101
Milutin more or less succeeded in his goal of modernizing the military; “by the
end of Miliutin’s tenure Russian arms were roughly up to the European standard.”102 By
1870, he built an army reserve corps that enabled the smaller standing army he had hoped
for.103 Due to Miliutin’s persistence, the reform army was also somewhat less costly and
better trained. Increasing basic literacy and numeracy for peasant conscripts allowed the
military to use advanced weaponry more effectively, and officers received a better
technical educations than their predecessors.104 (However, the Russian Army still faltered
in combat and field tactics, which the Russo-Turkish war exposed. 105) An unintended
consequence of military reform was that peasant soldiers returned to their villages combat
ready, capable of inciting or leading rebellion and even more dangerous to the state than
they were previously.
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Judicial Reform 1864
Alexander II, like Peter the Great before him, felt that Russia’s corrupt legal
system needed to be reformed. For many citizens, “the law did not exist.”106 In late 1861,
Alexander set up a commission of officials and jurists to discuss and determine the
general principles of a “radical transformation of the Russian legal system.”107 Alexander
instructed the commission to plan the reorganization of the judiciary based on the
example of European court systems and legal theories. The commission studied the flaws
of the existing system and found twenty-five “radical defects” that deviated from
“European public law and science.”108 The commission decided to propose an
independent judiciary. Alexander II accepted this recommendation and separated the
judiciary from the bureaucracy, in an attempt to remove the state’s influence on the legal
process.109 The commission also argued that the Russian legal system was too
complicated. The main principles of the reform were made public in October 1862, and
“comments were invited from universities, officers of the law, and private individuals.”110
The more than 400 comments and observations received were reviewed by a committee
of “the best jurists of the empire, charged with preparing the detailed legislation.”111 This
committee worked for just under a year, preparing a draft of legal codes of procedure and
new judicial institutions, which received the emperor’s approval in late 1864.
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The new judicial system tried to address the defects the commission had
identified. It was public, provided for a bar, justices of the peace were elected, judges
received tenure, and trial by jury was introduced. Jurors were drawn from many social
groups, including the peasantry.112 These changes limited the power of the autocracy by
establishing legal order within the judiciary.113 The reformed judiciary was divided into
two parts: the peace courts (presided over by justices of the peace) and the regular court,
each of which included a court of appeals.
The peace courts dealt with petty cases, small conflicts, and “disputes of everyday
life,” and the justices of the peace were at first elected by popular vote, then later by the
zemstvos. The regular court heard more serious cases, and their judges were nominated
by the emperor. The peace courts succeeded in improving rural justice. Previously, if two
peasants had a disagreement, their problem was left unsolved, and they were both
punished. The new peace courts treated people politely, listened well to complaints, and
tried to reach a positive and fair outcome for all those involved.114 The regular courts
improved as well, through the establishment of public trial and trials by jury.115 The first
of these reform courts opened in 1866. While these courts did modernize the judicial
system as intended, in some areas of the empire the new system was applied in a
“modified form”; for example, trial by jury was not applied to courts in the Caucuses,
Poland or the western provinces.116
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Revolutionaries took advantage of the public trials as forums to propagandize
their ideas, alarming the tsar, who removed political trials from the reform courts in 1878,
which outraged people. This reform did, however, succeed in making the court system an
easier and more useful experience for the common people than previously.117 The new
courts, especially the peace courts, were very popular among the people to settle common
disputes because they knew that the justices would treat them politely, act quickly
(without the long drawn out decisions of a bureaucratized system), and above all they
acted without “bribes or blackmail.”118 Before Alexander II began to withdraw his
judicial reforms due to revolutionary agitation during trials, the new courts succeeded in
providing more equitable distribution of justice in the empire.

Why did the Great Reforms ultimately fail?
The French economist Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu compared the reforms of Alexander
II’s reign to building operations “carried out without a blueprint, without any general
plan, [and] without an architect to coordinate the different operations.”119 He believed
that the autocracy introduced innovations into an ancient structure, while “neglecting
nearby indispensable repairs,” causing incomplete social and economic transformation.
For example, the Ministry of the Interior remained in the hands of “bureaucratic
centralizers,” which meant that the new self-governing institutions created by the reforms
struggled to develop true independence.120
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Alexander quickly realized that his “thaw” threatened his own power. The public
began to criticize “every measure of the Emperor and his government.”121 This small taste
of freedom caused them to demand more. A return to the police state that Nicholas I had
created was now intolerable. The public, who had been completely excluded from public
life under Nicholas, “now protested that the relative freedom permitted by Alexander was
insufficient.”122 Alexander II’s attempts to accommodate all points of view and his belief
in the necessity of compromise ultimately “making the New Russia an incomplete and
uncomfortable dwelling where friends and opponents of innovation felt almost equally ill
at ease.”123
Another reason that the reforms did not last was Alexander’s adamant refusal,
until the last day of his life, to agree to a constitution. Desire for a constitution was first
expressed in the assemblies of the nobility in the early years of the Great Reform era, but
the tsar blocked it. As Mosse writes, “constitutionalism was not in accord with Russia’s
political tradition.”124 Alexander believed that he had a God-given right to rule; power
sharing in any form would, in his view, diminish his divine authority. When the St.
Petersburg zemstvo pressed for a constitution in 1865, Alexander claimed that a
constitution would lead to Russia’s demise.125 He then dissolved the St. Petersburg
zemstvo and exiled some of its leading members, weakening the constitutional movement
in the zemstvos until it was revived in 1875.
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The tragedy, of course, is that the Great Reforms directly led to Alexander’s
assassination by the revolutionary group the People’s Will. Alexander’s version of
“glasnost” freed people to speak their minds, and those who spoke loudest wanted a
revolution. The first of many attempts on Alexander’s life occurred on April 16, 1866
when he was shot at in the Winter Garden.126 Investigations revealed that many members
of the revolutionary circles were students, so Alexander, in an attempt to “change the
spirit of Russian youth,” released a rescript calling for the suppression of “subversive
activities” in universities and other educational institutions.127 This began what were, in
effect, educational counter reforms, where “teachers became officials and were forced to
act as spies and policemen.”128 Many students were expelled for trivial breaches of
discipline, causing “the ranks of the malcontents” to swell, as the expelled student
became the most common figures in revolutionary groups.129 Through political
maneuvering, conservatives began to replace liberals in the government, and Alexander’s
complete trust in his Chief of Police, P.A. Shuvalov, led to him appointing archconservatives to the Ministries of Justice and the Interior. In 1867 Count K.I Pahlen
replaced D.N. Zamiatin, “the patron of the judicial reforms.” Count Pahlen was an
extremely conservative opponent of the reforms; with his appointment, coupled with
other conservative appointments, the establishment of a reactionary government was
complete.130
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In the last decade of his life, Alexander was disillusioned, cynical, and isolated,
due to the many assassination attempts by revolutionary groups. He could not understand
his own unpopularity and the unpopularity of his reforms, believing that all he had to do
to make an enemy was “to do [them] a favor.”131 By the late 1870s, the revolutionary
movement had become increasingly violent, and in early 1877 the “government staged
the first mass trial of revolutionaries.”132 As the trials were, at first, held in the new
reform courts with juries, the accused were often acquitted or received very light
sentences. Many who were acquitted were rearrested and exiled; those who were
sentenced to prison saw their sentences increased.
In January 1878, Fyodor Trepov, the chief of the St. Petersburg police, was shot
and wounded by a revolutionary noblewoman, Vera Zasulich, the daughter of a general.
Acquitted by the jury, her comrades whisked her away to Switzerland before the police
could rearrest her following the trial. After this scandal, the government declared that in
the future, “rebellion, assassination or attempts on the lives of officials would be tried in
military courts.”133 Violence continued regardless. In 1879, Prince Dimitri Kropotkin was
killed, and an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of General A.R. Drenteln, the
new head of the Third Division, the palace secret police.134 This was followed by another
attempt on the tsar’s life.135 The public’s refusal to cooperate with the authorities allowed
the revolutionaries to escape completely after successful or unsuccessful assassination
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attempts. Governors-General across Russia were granted state-of-emergency powers, and
military courts worked to convict and execute revolutionaries.
Despite the increased pressure (or because of it), on September 7, 1879, the
terrorist group the People’s Will “formally condemned Alexander Romanov to death…
[and] from now on every effort of the movement was directed to his assassination.”136
When their first attempts failed, they published an appeal to the tsar claiming they would
continue unless he called a Constituent Assembly.137 Yet another assassination attempt
failed in 1880, and Alexander authorized a new Supreme Executive Committee formed
with immense powers, composed of both conservatives and liberals. This committee tried
to appease the public by releasing political prisoners and allowing the press greater
freedoms. After six months, the public seemed pacified.138 The tsar and his commission
planned “the formation of two commissions to prepare legislation,” one financial and one
administrative. These commissions would be composed of zemstvo representatives,
officials, professors, and publicists. What they drafted “would come before a General
Commission to be composed of the two Preparatory Commissions together with two
elected ‘experts’ from each provincial zemstvo and major city.”139
Alexander was willing to accept the commission’s recommendation for a modest
constitution, hoping that this concession would restore public trust in him. However, it
was too late. On Sunday, March 13, 1881, Alexander gave “his final approval to the
proposed constitutional innovations.” Later that day, he was assassinated by members of
the People’s Will as he was returning to the palace after inspecting the Sunday Parades
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and visiting his cousin, Grand Duchess Catherine. His death marked the end of reform era
as his heir, Alexander III, immediately proceeded to undo many of Alexander II’s
reforms.
Alexander II’s sweeping reforms dramatically changed Russia, even though he
regretted many of them. Despite the many problems the emancipation created, the
nobility’s unlimited, arbitrary, and often abusive power over their serfs ended. The
liberation of millions of serfs and state peasants “was a watershed, a turning point in
Russian history.”140 The new railway lines and the expansion of banking and credit
facilities also laid the foundation for an industrial revolution.141 Alexander relaxed
authoritarianism and centralization, increased self-rule in towns and the countryside, and
lessened the power and influence of the nobility. However, his reforms did not go far
enough, bringing about political instability and the flourishing of revolutionary groups
and movements. The tsar desperately tried to retreat from some of his reforms, but there
was no going back in the minds of the people. The reforms put into motion the forces of
political and social change that proved unstoppable and would eventually lead to
revolutions in 1905 and 1917.
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Part Two: The Gorbachev Era
Introduction
In 1917, only thirty-six years after the assassination of Alexander II, the
monarchy was toppled, and power in Russia transferred to the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU). By the 1980s, more than six decades after the revolution, the
USSR still had not achieved economic prosperity and was on the verge of crisis. When
Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985, the Soviet economy
was stagnating. Domestic problems were abundant: “corruption, the decay of the social
infrastructure, declining economic dynamism,” the decline of technological advancement,
as well as “difficulty of implementing policies despite the centralized controls exerted by
the ministries.”142 Gorbachev not only inherited a superpower; domestically, he also
“inherited a hidebound bureaucracy and an economy whose growth was in long-term
decline from the 1950s to the 1980s.”143 Furthermore, “the gap in the efficiency of
production, quality of products, scientific and technological development, the production
of advanced technology and the use of advanced techniques began to widen” between
Russia and the West.144 The standard of living was declining, and with “decreasing
returns on investment, low labor productivity,” coupled with the decline of science and
technology compared to the West, the country was in trouble.145
Agricultural production did not produce enough food for the nation, due to
widespread inefficiencies on the collective farms: “sluggish economic growth and
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agricultural difficulties could no longer sustain rises in consumption.”146 Harvests were so
low that millions of tons of grain had to be imported “to reduce the food and feed grain
deficit.”147 For example, in 1984 the Soviet Union produced “170 million metric tons, 70
million short of the planned target,” lower than the average level from the 1960s.148
Despite these pressing issues, the money spent each year on the military industrial
complex in the Soviet Union continued to increase, despite little to no yearly growth in
gross domestic product.149 By 1985, the defense budget was no longer sustainable. With
so many problems, the state of the economy and its infrastructure could no longer be
ignored. According to Gorbachev, a major shortcoming of the Soviet economic system
was a “lack of inner stimuli for self-development.” He also pointed to the fact that wages
were guaranteed regardless of the cost or quality of goods. Prices were fixed, the market
was guaranteed, and the states covered all losses.150 Gorbachev believed that through a
“profound structural reorganization of the economy,” investment in new technologies, a
focus on investment policy changes and “high standards in management,” acceleration of
scientific and technological advancement could be achieved.151
Another major problem was the large and inefficient bureaucracy, which harbored
widespread corruption, such as bribery and severe abuses of power.152 In addition, the
political system was “palpably anti-pluralistic,” with the highest authority resting within
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the Communist Party and the various Party organs and ministries.153 Gorbachev argued
that the USSR could not meet the basic social needs, including housing, health care,
foodstuffs, and consumer goods.154 He was faced with the paradox of a country that could
send rockets to space but could not make basic decent household appliances. Gorbachev
also hoped to conquer numerous societal problems, namely “alcoholism, drug addiction,
and crime.”155
Like Alexander II, Gorbachev believed his country “was verging on crisis.”156 He
was not, however, ready to abandon the communist project. He hoped that through
modernizing reforms, he could salvage what he believed were Leninist ideals. However,
his reforms—glasnost, which ended censorship and other restrictions on free speech, and
perestroika of the political and economic system—led to numerous unintended
consequences that contributed significantly to the end of communism and the dissolution
the Soviet Union, including Gorbachev’s ousting on December 25, 1991.

Gorbachev’s First Year
Gorbachev, unlike past Party secretaries, was “entirely dependent on the
Politburo, but he had a better opportunity than his immediate predecessors to make
substantial changes in its composition.”157 Gorbachev’s open leadership style was
unfamiliar to Soviet citizens. His “new style was perhaps designed to inspire, but ‘shock
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treatment’ was required to get rapid results.”158 Gorbachev travelled around the country,
speaking with citizens, discussing problems and issues that impacted people’s everyday
lives. For example, Gorbachev spoke with a chief surgeon in a hospital in Moscow who
had many grievances, including too few qualified staff, insufficient pay, serious shortages
of equipment and modern drugs.159 Gorbachev provided Soviet citizens with a fresh,
“simpler, less pompous style” of leadership they had never experienced before, which
was intended to both gain him popular support and “be a model for other Party
officials.”160

Glasnost
Like Alexander II, Gorbachev believed that censorship needed to be drastically
curtailed in order to promote the growth of culture and the flourishing of ideas. In his first
speech on March 11, 1985, he called for more openness in the Party and the government;
at the 27th Party Congress the following year, he argued that glasnost was the
precondition for restructuring. In February 1987 Gorbachev announced “a manifesto for
glasnost,” stating that there should be no “blank pages” in Soviet history or literature, but
he also warned that “criticism should always be from a party point of view.”161
There were three parts to glasnost: information, discussion, and participation. The
first, information, included “the lifting of most restrictions on the circulation of
information,” but not the complete abolition of censorship.162 One of Gorbachev’s first

158

Medvedev, 184.
Ibid., 185.
160 Ibid., 186.
161 Sakwa, 66.
162 Ibid.
159

48
steps was to stop jamming the BBC and other Western radio stations. In June 1986, the
censorship functions of Glavlit (Main Administration of Literature and State Publishing
Houses) were abolished. Similar to Alexander II’s abolition of preliminary censorship,
published works and those to be published no longer needed Glavlit’s approval, although
Glavlit was still allowed “to monitor security matters.”163 Publishers, filmmakers, writers,
and editors were no longer forced to be “directly answerable to the propaganda
department of the Central Committee.”164 By 1989, previously banned books and authors
were published, such as Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago, George Orwell’s 1984, and
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago.165
Although intellectuals may have rushed to buy Doctor Zhivago, most ordinary
citizens experienced glasnost through films, which had for decades been “the main filler
of leisure time.”166 Before Gorbachev, the production and creative process had to be
filtered through the Communist Party’s lens. Glasnost and perestroika gave filmmakers
creative license and allowed moviegoers to see many previously banned films. Poets,
writers, filmmakers, and other artists immediately “responded enthusiastically to
Gorbachev’s initial directives for perestroika and glasnost.”167 Criticism of everything
from collectivization, to Stalinism, to “censorship in art and literature” began to appear
across artistic spheres, including the official press. 168 Filmmakers enjoyed their newfound
freedom of expression, and could produce movies on basically whatever they chose. New
163
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films reflected the inquiring spirit of the reform era, as “at no other time were there so
many film titles ending with a question mark or suspension dots — a visible sign of
anxiety and frustration.”169 Gorbachev hoped giving the Soviet intelligentsia freedom of
expression would bring him their support, thereby lending “credibility to Gorbachev’s
policies in the eyes of the people, and to mobilize public support.”170
The relaxation of censorship was meant to show the Soviet people “life with all its
contradictions and complexity.”171 Under Stalin’s rule, even maps of the USSR had been
censored as “state secrets.” With most of these restrictions lifted, Soviet citizens were
able to learn more about their country through maps, economic statistics, and historical
data. Details about past disasters, such as the 1957 nuclear explosion in the Ural
Mountains, were released, and information about current disasters and accidents became
“increasingly swift and full.”172 In Gorbachev’s first year in power, up to 2,000 letters a
day addressed to the government were received. Article 49 in the Soviet constitution
stated that anything written to officials or the government could not be considered antiSoviet propaganda or used for prosecution, as long as the letters were not released
publicly. Enforcement of this article allowed for the floodgates of criticism to open, and
millions of letters were written to the Kremlin. Although KGB officials looking to
prosecute someone would sometimes deliberately release these letters to the general
public, Gorbachev valued these letters, often quoting from them in speeches, and using
them as a “barometer of public opinion.”173
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Before Gorbachev’s rule, the lack of Party and government transparency and the
significant gap between “leadership assertions and popular knowledge,” had grown so
significantly “as to constitute a veritable crisis of authority.”174 Like Alexander II’s
censorship reform, glasnost attempted to bridge this divide and restore credibility and
authority to the government by ending the secrecy of the past and establishing new
communication networks between the government and the people. Just as the proceedings
of the emancipation process under Alexander II were shared with the press and the
public, full reports began to be published about Party meetings. Central Committee
meetings were also occasionally televised. The Party’s theoretical journal Kommunist
received an infusion of liberal writers, which allowed it to “become the intellectual muse
of the Gorbachev regime and the forum for vigorous debate.”175 The conservative editor
of the newspaper Pravda, “the organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” was
dismissed in 1989 and replaced by Ivan Frolov, a former advisor to Gorbachev, who
introduced a discussion page to the journal.176
Economic reforms were debated in many newspapers and journals, and fact
bulletins examining Soviet reality like Argumenty i fakty sold millions of copies by 1990.
Many Party and government journals were reorganized and given new voices, dropping
much of the propaganda of the past. Though subscriptions to these major Party journals
fell in 1989, “the circulation of the more radical and non-party papers increased.”177
Although the BBC and other Western stations had been unjammed in 1985, it was not
until December 1988 that the “overtly political” Russian language broadcasts by the
174
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Western stations Radio Liberty and Deutsche Welle were unjammed.178 The Law on
Press Freedom was only promulgated in June 1990, which legally abolished the
institution of censorship, except to protect “state secrets, to prevent pornography, and to
impair the promotion of war and ethnic conflict.”179 The law established press freedoms
already in practice, but critics complained that “some of the clauses were unduly
restrictive,” with the CPSU still carrying “undue weight” as they owned the vast majority
of papers.180 Despite these concerns, the law allowed for self-financing independent
journals, and the “unofficial press” flourished.181
“Discussion,” glasnost’s second goal, was focused on debates in the press and on
rejuvenation of the social sciences, particularly history. For example, the Soviet history
taught in schools was so distorted that it was “meaningless,” leading to school textbooks
on twentieth century history being withdrawn from schools, to be replaced by a “more
truthful version” commissioned in 1988.182 Public debate flourished, although “there were
limits to the scope of discussion, and leadership policies themselves remained relatively
immune to criticism.”183 Many citizens feared the consequences of speaking openly about
government policies, due to their experiences with other Soviet leaders. There was some
justification for this concern, as the press was “constantly under pressure.” For example,
Gorbachev criticized the editor of Argumenty i fakty in Party meetings in October 1989
for publishing a survey of readers’ letters that demonstrated Gorbachev’s unpopularity.184
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Participation, the last aspect of glasnost, meant that the Party would exhibit “a
greater trust in the population [that] was to be reciprocated by a greater involvement on
their part in solving the problems of society.”185 Just as Alexander II encouraged his
nobles to participate in the emancipation process, Gorbachev felt that for the reforms to
be successful (especially his efforts to weaken the bureaucracy), citizens needed to be
active participants. Therefore, another component of the Gorbachev era was the
encouragement of workplace democracy in society. Gorbachev believed that the
bureaucracy needed to be challenged if production and efficiency were to improve, so he
attempted to enlist support from below through the concept of “self-management” and
mass participation.186
Participation took many forms, such as “nationwide discussions preceding the
adoption of important documents,” similar to the lengthy discussions across the country
about the Emancipation in the late 1850s. In addition, procedures for local soviets were
modified to “make participation more effective.”187 In 1986, the Party received “over 6
million suggestions” during the discussion over the revised Party program. In June 1987,
the Law on Nationwide Discussions “established a legal framework” for participation in
open discussions across the Soviet Union.188 Gorbachev felt that if there was to be true
mass participation from the citizenry, “tolerance for differing viewpoints” was
necessary.189
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Despite Gorbachev’s promises, people still feared reprisals for expressing their
own opinions. Gorbachev recognized these fears and responded with the law of June 30,
1987, which “gave citizens for the first time the right of legal appeal against the violation
of their rights by public officials.”190 This law established “a legal framework” to
encourage mass participation “without fear of recrimination.”191 The constitutional
amendments of November 1988 were discussed for five weeks, with “some 300,000
contributions leading to changes in half of the draft articles.”192 Under these reforms, the
citizenry became more politically aware, expressing their opinions in letters to the
government, newspaper articles, and even demonstrations and rallies.193
The other important element of participation was the institution of workplace
democracy through “self-management,” and the democratization of industry. The concept
of self-management as a way to activate society and increase participation by the people
in “the affairs of society and the state” was first discussed at the 27th Party Congress in
1986,194 but it was not implemented until later. In response to the Party Congress, debate
on the topic occurred in the press; for example, two Soviet historians discussed the
necessity for the “creation of real opportunities for workers to take part in economic
management” if the acceleration of the Soviet Union’s social and economic development
were to be achieved.195 The democratization of industry had “four main aspects.” The
first was “an attempt to make the concept of the ‘labor collective’ a living force in the life
of the enterprise,” achieved through the creation of “enterprise, shop and brigade councils
190
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(soviets) of self-management.”196 The purpose of these soviets was to create a sense of
democracy within enterprise and production, and involving the workers themselves in
aspects of management.
The second aspect was introducing an “electoral principle” into the workplace, by
which managers were to be elected by labor collectives. Even though the Party
maintained a “guiding role” in self-management, the workers were given more power
than before and elected managers were allowed to “resist party demands, but not those of
the workers.”197 The third aspect of the democratization process was the “revival of the
trade unions,” sparked in part by the Solidarity movement in Poland, which showed
Gorbachev how dangerous it was “if the gulf between workers and their alleged
representatives became too large.”198 The trade unions were now supposed to “defend the
rights of the workers” and interfere in management decisions if they violated the rules.
(Unions previously served no real function, as they were controlled by the councils of
workers collectives.)
The empowerment of the trade unions in 1989 was an attempt to calm the wave of
strikes across many industrial sectors and to lessen worker dissatisfaction. The trade
unions met in September 1989 at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and
discussed the need for the rights of workers to be heard, as well as collective bargaining
rights. An unforeseen consequence of the encouragement for reviving trade unions was
that union leadership “immediately set about braking the economic reforms by urging a
freeze on basic food prices until 1991,” in hopes of ameliorating workers’ standard of
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living in a time of economic uncertainty.199 This created a paradox: trade unions were
attempting to freeze food prices while the government was simultaneously attempting to
establish market pricing. This contradiction made economic reform “that much more
difficult.”200
The fourth and final aspect of democratization of industry and the workplace was
“a new approach to industrial relations,” including how strikes and violation of workers’
rights were to be treated. The press pointed out in 1989 that strikes were treated as illegal
when the “law says nothing at all on the subject.”201 In an attempt to clear this gray area, a
bill was drafted in April 1989 to regulate labor conflicts, but it was superseded three
months later by a new version that legalized strikes, except for “strategic sectors” like
railways, other public transport, and defense. However, there were restrictions for legal
strikes. These needed to undergo an elaborate process including a “three day ‘cooling-off
period,’” mediation by local judges, and a majority vote to strike.202 Though picketing
was not legal, and striking workers would forfeit their pay, for the first time managers
found responsible for causing the strike could be fired, and workers’ rights were
expanded beyond the official unions and workers’ collectives. This process of
democratization of industry and the workplace attempted to introduce accountability into
Soviet production, as well as to involve the workers in decision-making to help combat
the corrupt bureaucracy.
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All these measures to open society through more transparent communication gave
people more access to information than ever before, as well as allowing the government
to learn public opinion without resorting to the KGB. Through surveys, forums, and
critical opinion articles, Soviet citizens were for the most part able to express their views,
bridging the chasm between the public and the government that had been deepening for
years.

Glasnost: Implementation and Effects
Gorbachev and his fellow reformers believed that “a degree of critical freethinking was an essential element in the modernization process.”203 Glasnost increased
the information available to the public, “explored the extent of the crimes of the past and
revealed the shortcomings of the present.”204 Analysis and debate of past policies and
present reforms meant that “the party itself [was] forced to justify its leadership in new
ways,” and public criticism had exposed widespread discontent. While giving people new
freedoms, glasnost exposed and fostered societal discontent by exposing “bureaucratic
mismanagement and corruption.”205 However, just as Alexander II’s censorship reform
had led to discussions that questioned the autocracy itself, public debate under glasnost
similarly began questioning the communist system and the power of the Party.
Just as Alexander II had hoped the nobles would participate in and accept the
reform process, Gorbachev hoped the intelligentsia would also involve itself in the
reform process. Glasnost preceded economic perestroika because Gorbachev thought that
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their newfound cultural freedoms would “mobilize the intelligentsia to support his
changes against the entrenched bureaucracy.”206 A major achievement of glasnost was,
therefore, the revival of the intelligentsia as a “free-thinking and relatively independent
group to act as a counterweight to the bureaucracy and the administrative system.”207
A major problem with glasnost, however, was that while it allowed for open
discussion, disagreements between publishers and the authorities concerning what was
permissible led to a “situation of half glasnost.” This increased public discontent and
unrest, and increased the “pressure of public demands for full truth.”208 Similarly, giving
workers more rights to complain and participate made economic revival difficult.209

Reform and Restructuring of the Economy/Agriculture
Both Alexander II and Gorbachev began with small economic reforms when they
came to power. Therefore, the process of initial economic reform began in March 1985,
with consultations with several prominent economists, and the establishment of “special
commissions to investigate various urgent current problems.”210 Support within the
commissions split between two different options for solving the country’s many
problems. The first group, the “planners,” was led by academician Abel Aganbegyan and
supported using mathematical models to plan the economy. The second group, the “social
economists,” advocated for “some liberalization and the legalization of freelance
activities within some sectors,” because they believed “competition and the market could
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provide a stimulus” to the stagnating economy.211 Although these commissions did not
implement any decrees or plans in 1985, many of the “planner” ideas could “be
recognized in Gorbachev’s speeches…. and in the economic plans for the future.”212
In early April 1985, Gorbachev called together a group of industrial plant
directors for a one-day conference to discuss the dire need to increase efficiency, quality,
and to improve technology.213 Gorbachev explained to them that there would now be
penalties for production that did not meet standards, and that they would begin
implementing “an economic mechanism which would make income dependent on the
quality and profit of the product.”214 In August 1985, the Central Committee and the
Council of Ministers officially “linked the salaries of workers and other employees of
factories and plants with the quality of their production.”215 The Central Committee and
Politburo approved a program increasing production of cameras, cloth, radios,
kitchenware, and other “consumer goods and services for the period 1986-2000.”216
However, this proposal retained central planning, which was ill-equipped to predict
changing consumer demands.
Throughout 1985, Gorbachev travelled widely, giving “speeches on a wide range
of topics” throughout the country, discussing his long term plans to fix the many
problems facing the Soviet people. Nevertheless, the general economic plan published in
November 1985 “seemed to be constructed along traditional [conservative] lines.”217
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Well aware of the Soviet Union’s agricultural deficiencies, Gorbachev next
attempted to reorganize the agricultural economy to make it more efficient and
productive. He appointed Valeriy Boldin, an agronomist who headed Pravda’s
agricultural department, as his senior assistant. G.P. Rasumovsky was appointed as the
head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, placing him in a position
to replace “local agricultural officials” and aid in major agricultural reorganization. On
November 22, 1985 the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers “passed a
resolution which completely reorganized the agricultural administration.”218 Seven
ministries relating to agriculture were abolished and merged into two consolidated
organizations, the State Agro-industrial Committee and the Gosagroprom SSSR.219 This
reorganization essentially created a “separate agriculture government of the USSR,”
which could operate separately from the central Party organs and the “heavy, machine
tool and defense industries.”220
Agricultural experts gathered to have an open discussion about the pros and cons
of the system, specifically, to find remedies to solve the many problems. This discussion
was “significant in itself,” as never before had true open debate on agricultural methods
and problems been permitted, let alone officially encouraged.221 During the reform
period, a “rural exodus” exacerbated agricultural problems, with many citizens leaving
the villages for the cities. However, the more people who left, the harder the work
became for those who remained, leading them to leave as well. In response, on July 2,
1985 the Central Committee passed a decree that among other provisions would “prevent
218
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the employment of the rural workforce in industry or in towns in general,” once again
robbing the peasants of “their freedom of movement and choice of jobs.”222 The new
Party program also tried to address the exodus by raising food prices, which had not been
raised since 1962.
Gorbachev also announced an increase in private garden allotments to be leased to
industrial and office workers as an attempt to stimulate private initiative in agriculture, at
least on a small scale. These allotments proved significant for the production of fruits and
berries such as apple and pears, while flowers, garlic, and other products grown on these
allotments were sold in town markets. During the 1980s the importance of these
allotments for the countryside increased as state production of food decreased. Gorbachev
“was strongly in favor of increasing the number of allotments,” and in a speech in May
1985 announced that the allotment size would increase from 1 million to 1.2 million.
While the increase did not have much of an impact on Soviet agriculture as a whole, it
did have a “positive impact on the quality of people’s lives.”223 Gorbachev then
implemented the “collective contract scheme,” which allowed farmers to be contracted
“to achieve certain results within the collective farm system and [were] allowed to keep
part of the profits.”224 Although this change would theoretically increase incentives for
more efficient production, there were still was not enough incentives for farmers to do the
work as well as deal with all the “bureaucratic hurdles that had to be overcome.”225
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Not until 1987 did economic reform become a program of “structural change of
the whole organization of the economy,” called perestroika.226 Gorbachev himself defined
perestroika many ways: as mass initiative, the revival of the Soviet economy,
encouragement to innovate, and “socialist enterprise.” He saw perestroika as a means of
overcoming stagnation, “breaking down the braking mechanism, creating a dependable
and effective mechanism for the acceleration of social and economic progress and giving
it greater dynamism.”227 Gorbachev hoped that eventually the reforms would motivate
quality performance.228 He wanted every enterprise to follow “real social demands to
determine production and sale plans for itself,” based on actual orders by enterprises or
government organizations, instead of “numerous detailed assignments set by higher
bodies.”229 Gorbachev also wanted to encourage economic competition, which did not
exist in the planned economy, in order to satisfy real consumer demands, and for
employees’ incomes to be dependent on the quality and profits of the final product.230
One of the first steps in economic restructuring was converting the old statistical
board into the State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat), which would become “an
authoritative body for the gathering and publication of statistics.”231 During the Stalin era,
accurate statistical data were almost impossible to find, and since then most published
economic data were inaccurate (partly because inflation was never taken into account
during calculations). In order to proceed with economic reform, accurate statistics on the
true status, output, production, etc. of the economy were required, making the
226
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Goskomstat extremely important. Goskomstat began to produce more accurate
information for the Soviet leadership and the public, such as infant mortality rates,
employment rates, and life expectancy rates. Though Goskomstat attempted to sift
through decades of falsified economic data, it was extremely difficult to determine
accurate statistics for past production, and despite the agency’s efforts, the “new
statistical series on agriculture and investment offered little new by 1989.”232
An early act of economic perestroika was the “Law on Individual Labor
Activity,” which came into effect in May 1987, although it had been created in November
1986. The law allowed individuals to open small businesses such as restaurants and repair
services, “in competition with the often low quality state-run businesses.”233 Alhough the
new law permitted a bit of privatization, it was severely limited to family-run businesses
that could operate during the owners’ spare time from a state job.234 During the January
1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev wrote that the
meeting “encouraged extensive efforts to strengthen the democratic basis of Soviet
society, to develop self-government and extend glasnost, that is openness, in the entire
management network.”235 In his book Perestroika, he describes the realization at this
meeting “how stimulating that impulse was for the nation.”236 Gorbachev intended for
democratic changes to occur in all parts of society, especially in the Party and the work
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collective. He also stressed the need for more glasnost, more “genuine control from
‘below,’ and greater initiative and enterprise at work.”237
At the June 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Central
committee endorsed the major “radical reform” options, including the “Basic Provisions
for the Fundamental Restructuring of Economic Management,” created and proposed by
Soviet economists and some of Gorbachev’s associates. Though a centrally planned
economy is controlled from the top, Gorbachev wrote that at the meeting, the central
committee decided to start at a more basic level, with enterprises, and attempt to create
optimum economic conditions, “extend and consolidate their rights, and only on that
basis introduce fundamental changes in the activity of all higher echelons of economic
management.”238 The provisions focused on the decentralization of state industry by
giving autonomy to individual producers, which “marked the first steps towards a radical
overhauling of the Soviet economy.”239 These provisions were then incorporated into the
Law on State Enterprises. The draft of this law was discussed nationwide in trade union
meetings, worker collectives and the media. The modifications to the law were “meant to
extend the work collective’s rights,”240 and allowed for workers to “elect the managing
director as well as a council of workers’ collectives.”241 However, suggestions and
requests to “give up [the] planned economy” were rejected and not permitted by the Party
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leadership. Gorbachev wrote that his goal was for the reforms to “strengthen socialism,
not replace it with a different system.”242
After lengthy and extensive debate, drafts, and modifications, very similar to the
creation process of the peasant reform under Alexander II, the law was finally
implemented January 1, 1988. The law moved “60 percent of state enterprises on to a
system of self-management,” with the other 40 percent to be switched over by January
1989. This law allowed enterprises to set their own prices, engage in trade with other
enterprises, and managers now had to negotiate for raw materials in “a semblance of a
market,” instead of simply being allocated the resources.243 Mandatory targets for
production were no longer set from above, and unprofitable enterprises needed to cut
workers or wages, or in some cases, declare bankruptcy and close. More amendments to
the law were announced in 1989 and 1990, which “further weakened an enterprise’s
dependence on central planning and even allowed them to break away from their parent
ministry.”244 Ministry control declined, and enterprises were allowed to deal with foreign
companies, including in capitalist nations.245
Co-operatives, which were introduced to the USSR by the New Economic Policy
(1921- 1928), had been restricted by the state for the fear of encouraging private
enterprise. However, to Gorbachev and the Supreme Soviet, the co-operatives “appeared
to offer a way of rapidly improving certain quality of life industries,” without placing that
burden on the state itself. The Law on Co-operatives, implemented May 26, 1988 freed
co-operatives from the control of the state planning system, and “gave them equal rights
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with the state sector of the economy.”246 The co-operatives were also able to trade abroad
without government intervention. The Law on Leasing, which promoted “the
decentralization of the economy,” was introduced in the Supreme Soviet on November
23, 1989. This law “greatly expanded the legal rights of leaseholders,” weakening the
bureaucracy’s veto powers over the activities of the leaseholders. The law sought to
encourage leasing in all spheres of society, although it impacted workers first and
foremost.247 Workers would now be allowed to buy an enterprise that had been leased
from the state with the guarantee that “there would be no expropriation in the future.”248
Though the new law “was expected to yield rapid results in agriculture,” the law made it
unclear if farmers could also buy land, thus preventing the expected immediate positive
agricultural impact. Even though state interference in enterprise was supposed to
disappear, Gosplan, the state’s economic planning agency, purchased 86 percent of
production in 1988. Despite Gosplan’s promise to purchase only 25 percent of production
in 1990 to demonstrate a retreat from interference, in 1989 and early 1990 “state orders
still took 90 percent of enterprise output.”249
During the reform period, Gorbachev spoke frequently both in public and Party
meetings to defend restructuring and the reforms, answering questions from critics, and
giving speeches that appeared in newspapers, that defended his reforms and addressed
concerns. For example, in early 1989, Gorbachev gave a speech during a Central
Committee meeting to representatives from the scientific and artistic elite to defend the
reforms from critics on both left and right. He admitted to problems such as production
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shortages and the budget deficit but criticized those who “claim[ed] that restructuring
[was] leading to chaos,” and ultimately urged people “not to lose a sensible, realistic
assessment of what [was] happening” during this process of transformation, and breaking
with the outdated tendencies of the past.250
Gorbachev also frequently heard complaints and suggestions from groups like
workers and intellectuals. At a Party meeting in October 1989, Gorbachev and other
Party members listened to the concerns and requests of multiple workers; for example, an
“assembler” at the Kuibyshev Aircraft Plant talked about how “the population’s living
standard [was] considerably worse than it [was] in the Baltic republics,” which he said
was “not right.”251 In Gorbachev’s concluding statement at the end of the meeting, he
responded to this worker’s complaints, which were echoed by others in attendance, by
explaining that the government “had no ready-made formulas and answers” as to how to
fix the economic problems, and that perestroika was evolving through real life
implementation.252
Through frequent discussion and debate, Gorbachev hoped all groups in society
would involve and invest themselves in the reform process, in order to make success
more likely. He not only had to defend the reforms to the common people, but to the
Party as well. For example, Gorbachev’s closing remarks to the Party Plenum in April
1989 addressed concerns expressed by critics of restructuring, both in the Party and the
public. While acknowledging remaining problems, he blamed perestroika’s failure to
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produce the desired results on “the activity of central agencies.”253 Again, in May 1989,
he gave a speech to the Party that advocated for continuing reform, right before the secret
ballot vote for the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.254 Throughout the reform process,
Gorbachev was constantly defending the program to the Party, and to the public during
travels similar to his trips around the country in 1985.
In Gorbachev’s last two years in power, 1990 and 1991, he sought to form a team
of experts to fully transition the country to a market economy. Gorbachev asked Boris
Yeltsin, his former rival in the Communist Party255 who as a non-Party “liberal” had been
elected President of the Russian Republic, to put together a team of “radical economists”
to create the program. The so-called 500 Days Program, officially known as the
“Transition to the Market: Conception and Program,” focused on “large-scale
privatization, a great devolution of power to the republics, and the speedy construction of
market institutions.”256 However, Gorbachev was under immense political pressure from
his power base in the Party, so he retreated somewhat from the original 500 Days
Program. His retreat was an attempt to appease his critics, but he also feared the 500
Days Program would lead to the swift dissolution of the Soviet Union due to the
autonomy the program granted the republics.257 Gorbachev then asked his chief
economist Abel Aganbegyan to create a “compromise program which incorporated”
some of the original ideas from the “Transition to the Market” team, with elements that
might appease his political critics. However, just like Alexander II’s compromise version
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of the emancipation reform, this compromise version was unsatisfactory for both sides
involved.258
As more liberal reformers, led by Yeltsin, increased their criticism of the reforms,
Gorbachev turned to the Party for much needed political support, which led to more
concessions “made to conservative forces in the winter of 1990-1,” while at the same
time attempting to keep all sides appeased, an impossible task that Alexander II had also
faced. Ultimately the 500 Days Plan, or any amended version, could not be enacted due
to Gorbachev’s loss of power and authority, exemplified by the abortive August 1991
coup led by Party hardliners. After the attempted coup, Gorbachev waged a hopeless
battle to keep the Soviet Union intact before he gave into the inevitable and “resigned” on
December 25, 1991.

Perestroika’s Implementation/Consequences
Just as Alexander II faced opposition to the Emancipation from a multitude of
groups, perestroika was opposed by all sides. Within the Party, liberal reformers were
pitted against “old-style” Party members, while outside the Party debates raged on among
the public and in the press.259 Similar to the noble and peasant unhappiness with the
Emancipation in 1861, both conservatives and liberals in the Gorbachev era hated
perestroika for essentially opposing reasons. Party reformers were discontented with the
slow pace of the program, given the extensive changes, while Party hard-liners were quite
resistant to any movement away from communism. This dichotomy within the Party led
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to extensive compromises in an attempt to satisfy all sides, but just as few were happy
with the compromised Emancipation, few liked perestroika.
The implementation of the initial economic reform in 1985 had little impact on
either industry or agriculture. Perestroika actually gave the Soviet consumer “less choice
and fewer goods.”260 In the first three years of “radical” economic reform (1987-1990),
“one of the most over managed economies” was becoming “the most mismanaged.”261
There was zero growth, shops lacked basic consumer items, inflation grew, and “static
farm output” worsened the food deficit.262 Industrial output rose only 1.7 percent in 1989,
the lowest increase since 1945. Some new laws could not be implemented without added
state intervention. For example, at first the Law on Co-Operatives was seriously
compromised by a new tax, which allowed “local authorities to take up to 90 percent of
the co-operative profits.”263 This tax eliminated all incentives, so the Supreme Soviet
challenged the finance ministry and modified the tax law.264
Despite this, the Law on Co-Operatives succeeded in increasing the number of cooperatives in the country. In just two years the country had gone from less than 1,000
coops to over 130,000, “employing nearly 3 million people with a turnover of some 13
billion Rubles.”265 The co-ops focused mainly on “consumer goods and service industries
like restaurants, repairs, beauty salons and clothing, rather than moving into
manufacturing.”266 These cooperatives were as diverse as they were fast growing, but this
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success was not replicated in the agricultural sector. By 1989, the USSR was importing
“a quarter of its butter and cooking oil, a third of its sugar and two-fifths of its potatoes
and onions,” as well as 35 millions tons of grain.267
The poor condition of the Soviet economy, as well as the growing deficit and the
unsustainable defense budget, meant that from the outset Gorbachev did not have the
capital needed to implement his reforms. However, Gorbachev’s budget was further
reduced when he launched his “vigorous anti-alcohol campaign” in 1985.268 The price of
alcohol was increased, vineyards were destroyed, beer halls closed, and state production
of alcohol was halted in order to combat alcoholism. As the state held the monopoly on
alcohol production, especially vodka, this campaign led to a massive loss of state
revenue, about 10 billion rubles annually. Reform and reorganization were expensive
and; given the out of control military spending, lack of capital was a real roadblock to
Gorbachev’s success.
Early in the reform process, the deficit (which by 1985 had reached 37 billion
rubles) was not really considered, so instead of cutting back on spending, it was increased
by “taking on extra social and investment commitments while maintaining the military
budget.”269 This deficit was exacerbated by the anti-alcohol campaign, as described
above, and led to the emergence of a large bootleg liquor industry, not to mention
Gorbachev’s collapsing popularity. Gorbachev abandoned his temperance movement in
1990, after costing the state billions of rubles in revenue. By October 1988, the state
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deficit was estimated to be over 100 billion rubles, 11 percent of the GNP, and rose even
higher the following year.270
In general, prices for rent, groceries, and other necessities had been stable for
decades, even though production costs continued to increase. Government subsidies to
cover this increased each year. By 1990, the government was spending 100 billion rubles
a year on food subsidies alone, nearly 15% of the total Soviet budget. Price reforms were
considered necessary for the success of perestroika, so by 1986 there was open debate in
the press on this topic.271 If fully implemented, perestroika would have permanently tied
wages to productivity, while removing government subsidies on many goods and
services, such as food and gas.272 However, fearing a recurrence of the bread riots that
Khrushchev faced due to a dramatic planned price increase, Gorbachev postponed the
price reform until “a balance had been achieved between supply and demand of consumer
goods.”273 However, wages continued to rise faster than production. In an attempt to
relieve this problem temporarily, the government purchased 10 billion rubles of consumer
goods and new investment in consumer goods were announced in 1989, as well as a “10fold devaluation of the ruble in November 1989 for tourist transactions.”274
Another significant problem throughout Gorbachev’s rule was that the reformers
seemed not to understand the consequences of their reforms and legislation before
implementation. This exacerbated the already extreme public discontent, Gorbachev’s
personal unpopularity, and later in 1989, strikes. Lack of quality control worsened
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shortages and further strained the budget. As early as 1986, Gorbachev and the Party
planned to tackle the scarcity of consumer goods, as well as to “improve their quality
significantly and expand their assortment.”275 However, in an attempt to increase the
quality of goods, the State Quality Control Board rejected over six billion rubles worth of
goods, which led to bare shelves that further angered citizens. The anti-alcohol campaign
provides another example of legislation implemented before the economic and social
consequences had been thoroughly analyzed.
Besides the economic consequences of perestroika, strikes in summer 1989
demonstrated overwhelming public anger with the “failures of economic perestroika.”276
For example, the strike in the Kemerovo mines in 1989 occurred because the Ministry of
the Coal industry was “doing everything it could to restrain and prevent mine collectives
from managing their own affairs… from doing what the Law on the Enterprise allows
them to do,” which angered workers.277 The Party newspaper Pravda reported in July
1989 that miners were still striking in Chervonograd and Lvov provinces, and in “74 of
121 mines in the Donets Basin.”278 Unemployment, a previously unknown concept
(although underemployment was common), came as another shock. Although wages were
much lower than in the West, guaranteed employment created a sense of stability. The
implementation of perestroika led to over three million people becoming jobless since
1985.279
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Gorbachev also worried that “if the gulf between bureaucratized union hierarchy
and a dissatisfied labor force” grew too big, coupled with falling standards of living and
political instability, strikes would become rampant as they had in Poland under similar
conditions in July 1989.280 Gorbachev, like Alexander II, expected gratitude for his
reforms, not scorn. Just as Alexander II and his advisers carefully followed the opinions
of the nobility, the peasantry, and the press during the Emancipation process, the AllUnion Centre for the Study of Public Opinion of Socio-Economic Problems polled the
population in order to determine their attitudes about the changes. A survey in August
1989 revealed “profound pessimism” about perestroika, with “only one person in eight
believing that it would improve life in the next few years and seven out of ten thinking
that there would be little change for the better.”281 This public pessimism with perestroika
contributed to growing discontent and increasing social and political instability.

Education, Science, and Technology
Education reform under Gorbachev was not as comprehensive as Alexander II’s,
but instead an attempt at technological modernization as well as further development of
vocational training and education in general. Gorbachev pushed to introduce technology
into the educational system, beginning in January 1985 when the Collegium of the
Ministry of Education announced the plan to create a computer technology course at all
“Soviet senior secondary schools.”282 In March 1985, the computer technology course
“Principles of Information Science and Computer Technology” was introduced to all
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grades in general education schools as well as vocational schools. Teachers in the Soviet
Union underwent a “highly complex process of peer and supervisory review” from 1986
to 1990, where they were evaluated and judged fit to continue in “their present positions,
in need of in-service training, or as candidates for job dismissal.”283 The results of these
evaluations were also tied with salary increases, as those who received the best ratings
were given the highest increases.
In addition, before 1986, students started school at age seven, beginning a tenyear program. After 1986, six-year-old students were, for the first time, to be enrolled in
an eleven-year program of schooling. In terms of older students, particularly those in
senior secondary school, vocational training and experience became a major focus.
Vocational education and labor training programs were introduced into general education
schools. Students would take courses during school and as extracurricular training, such
as courses at “production training workshops and farming plots located directly at schools
and at local or district interschool production training centers.” The main goal of these
changes was to improve general education and technical and vocational training in order
to facilitate modernization of Soviet industry and agriculture.

Legal Reform
Just as Alexander II’s judicial reform of 1864 was intended to create a lawabiding citizenry, legal reform in the Soviet Union similarly attempted to establish a
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“state governed by law.”284 After the October Revolution, the legal system was rebuilt
“according to the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideas,” relating to the class struggle and
the need for a strong state “to defeat enemies and build socialism.”285 Theory and
ideology “came before law,” and this “victory of socialism over the law” remained in
place until Gorbachev came to power. Gorbachev’s training as a lawyer instilled in him
the belief that “democracy cannot exist and develop without the rule of law.”286
The question of judicial reform became a topic of public debate among
intellectuals. For example, an interview of the Director of the USSR Academy of
Sciences’ Institute of State and Law Academician V. Kudryavtsev was published in 1986,
where he discussed the need for “better trained lawyers, more rights for defense counsel,”
and some form of oversight “to counter courts’ violations of legality.”287 The new plan
for the “socialist legal state” was to avoid arbitrariness, red tape, and “strengthen
democracy through law.”288 This legal “revolution” began at the 19th Party Conference in
1988, where Gorbachev attempted to create a program to “separate the legal system from
the power system,” as well as clarify laws to reduce arbitrariness.289 The focus shifted
from the collective to the individual as the resolution “On Legal Reform,” which secured
guaranteed and protected rights for individuals in the Soviet Union.290 Significantly, for
the first time in Soviet history, “no appeal to a higher law of class interests would take
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precedence over due process,” and Party officials were no longer above the law.291
However, the dominance of the Party remained as the “ultimate judge of what was legal
and tolerated” in the name of socialism and the working class.”292 Over the years this
caused much dissident activity, particularly from those attempting to create pressure to
repeal Article 6 of the 1977 constitution, which guaranteed Party dominance.293
On December 1, 1988 new amendments to the constitution were passed, including
the creation of a Congress of People’s Deputies with 2,250 seats, 1,500 of which would
be chosen in general elections. The Congress of People’s Deputies resembled Alexander
II’s zemstvos in that their purpose was to represent all members of society. The
amendments “restricted state power to a certain degree but did not introduce a pluralistic
constitution.”294 These amendments enhanced the independence of the judiciary, reduced
prison sentences, required judges to be elected by higher Soviets, and decreed courts
were to strictly follow the constitution. In addition, two anti-dissident articles pertaining
to anti-Soviet propaganda and slander were removed from the penal code.295 During the
Supreme Soviet meeting in 1989, some fought to separate the judicial system completely
from “the arbitrariness of the party and the state apparatus,” but the final draft failed to do
so.296
A new constitution was to be drafted by the Constitutional Commission, chaired
by Gorbachev himself, as established by the Congress in June 1989. This constitution,
which would replace the 1977 constitution, was intended to focus on the concept of
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respect for individual liberties. This commission drafted dozens of laws, ranging from
press freedom to religious freedom. However, because economic reform, particularly in
terms of giving more independence to enterprises and allowing for foreign investment,
required a legal framework as a basis, economic laws had to be hastily created in order to
successfully implement certain aspects of economic reform.297

Reform of the Soviet Political System
The political system of the Soviet Union “was palpably anti-pluralistic,” and the
highest authority rested in the Party organs with much of the “day-to-day decisionmaking power lodged in the ministries.”298 Gorbachev hoped that political reforms would
limit the Party bureaucracy to allow for more social and economic freedom in society.
The political reform was a long-term process with three major components, the first being
electoral reform. As part of Gorbachev’s plan to activate society, democratic elections
were introduced “into party, economic and social life,” designed to act as a “main
weapon for democratization.”299
The Soviet Union was a one-party state with compulsory voting in uncontested
elections. If there were a choice, it was between Party members. This single party system
had led to widespread patronage networks and rampant corruption; the new electoral
reform attempted to combat the political system by forcing it “to operate in the context of
competing and open politics.”300 The process of electoral reform began with Soviet
experts studying the results of electoral reform in Poland and Hungary, and “some of the
297
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lessons were incorporated in the limited trials with multiple candidates in the June 1987
local elections, when competitive elections were held in some 5 per cent of
constituencies.”301
A new election law, promulgated in December 1988, guaranteed the right to free
discussion of “political, personal and professional qualities of candidates and the right to
campaign for or against them.”302 At first, however, not all seats in the Congress of
People’s Deputies were elected by popular vote. The Congress was composed of three
chambers of 750 members each, and “competitive general elections were to take place for
only two of them.”303 The third chamber was made of one hundred percent guaranteed
seats to the Communist Party, the trade unions, and other major Party organizations like
the Komsomol. The nomination process for representatives was difficult and
cumbersome. In the initial 1988 election law, the nomination process included two
stages. In the first stage, names had to be “proposed by a factory, office, registered
association or at a local meeting of not less than 500 people and accepted by at least half
those present.”304 In the second stage, the candidates had to be vetted at pre-election
meetings where the “candidate again had to receive the support of over half those
present.”305 This made it difficult for radicals to enter the Congress because there were no
formal criteria for the approval of candidates, which “gave the party bureaucracy in the
localities great scope for manipulation.”306
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Though this electoral law was meant to break up the patronage system and lessen
corruption within the Party and bureaucracy, any threat to the Party’s power was still not
tolerated, and “no group was allowed in any official way to challenge the Communist
Party or to publicize their views in the media.” This made a multi-party system difficult
to achieve, even though it had been an announced goal of electoral reform. The March
1989 election was the first trial of the new law, where “two-thirds of the Congress’s
2,250 deputies were to be elected by secret ballot in constituency elections.”307 After the
second stage of nominations, a total of 2,901 candidates appeared on the ballot, of which
85 percent were CP members. In many constituencies, the Party bureaucracy allowed
only one name forward through the second stage, “usually a party official,” which led to
an even higher proportion of Party members on the ballot than in past-uncontested
elections.308 However, some radicals did manage to get elected, such as “radical
journalist” Yuri Chernichenko, and Nikolai Ivanov, “the leading prosecutor against
Brezhnevite corruption.”309 Twenty percent of Party officials standing for election were
defeated, including thirty-four candidates who lost despite running unopposed, defeated
by “cross-out” campaigns started by their constituents. Though these Party officials did
not have to resign their Party posts at first, after 1989 “their positions became untenable
once they had been defeated in the popular vote.”310
In December 1989, the Congress abolished the quota system that guaranteed seats
for the Party and for Party organizations. In future elections, all seats would be put to
popular vote, including the post of Party secretary, that is, Gorbachev himself. The
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second stage in the nomination process from the election law of 1988 was also
abandoned.311 At the Congress, some Party members also mentioned allowing the
“collectives of specialized secondary and higher education institutions the right to
nominate candidates” for the Congress, in hopes of expanding youth participation in
elections.312
Before the electoral reform, ballots were not truly secret; it was a common
practice to drop an unmarked ballot into the ballot box, as making any marks on the
ballot would “draw attention to oneself as a probably negative voter.”313 Though voters
had the legal right to a secret ballot, in practice citizens would not ask for one for fear of
unwanted attention from the KGB. In the 1989 elections, however, voters were required
to make a mark on their ballot in order for it to be counted, thus giving a sense of
anonymity to the voting box for the first time because every citizen had to make the
marks. Thus the national elections in 1989 were historic for the Soviet Union as it was
the first election “to combine universal adult suffrage with secrecy of the ballot and the
competitive principle in at least a majority of seats.”314
The second component in the reform of the Soviet political system was, as
mentioned previously, the creation of the Congress of People’s Deputies. The Congress
was originally supposed to be tasked with electing the “inner body, the bi-cameral, 543member Supreme Soviet.”315 Though the Supreme Soviet was supposed to meet for a
longer period than the Congress, the Congress ended up staying in session much longer
311
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than originally planned with public debate and discussion “breaking one taboo after
another.”316 All the speeches and proceedings of the Congress were televised and
broadcasted on the radio for the Soviet people to watch and listen to; in public opinion
polls many citizens expressed hope in the promise of the Congress.317 The speeches made
by representatives touched on many topics relevant to Soviet life and reality, such as an
outright attack on the KGB, and a call for the new Supreme Soviet to hold it accountable
for their activities.318 In fact, one of the first outcomes of the “initial sessions of the new
Supreme Soviet was the setting up of a whole series of commissions and committees,”
including a permanent committee on Soviet defense and state security tasked with
holding the military and state security agencies accountable to the legislature, instead of
the Party.319 The Supreme Soviet created a total of fifteen committees, including the
Constitutional Commission tasked with drafting “new fundamental law” for the new
constitution of the Soviet Union.320
The final component of the political reform was change within the Communist
Party itself. In August 1988 Gorbachev presented “concrete proposals for the
restructuring of the Central Committee apparatus,” and these plans, along with statistics
on the size of the Central Committee, were published for the public to read. By reducing
the size of the Central Committee by 50 percent, Gorbachev hoped to usher in a new era
of more responsible leadership. He counted on 40 percent of the Central Committee
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retiring or taking other jobs by the end of 1988.321 Central Committee departments were
trimmed from twenty to nine, and six new, more reform-orientated commissions, were
created. Three of these new commissions were chaired by men close to Gorbachev and
considered “serious reformers”: Georgiy Razumovsky (Party construction and cadres
policy), Vadim Medvedev (ideology), and Aleksandr Yakovlev (international policy).322
Gorbachev succeeded in getting a significant turnover, with over one hundred
members resigning from the Central Committee at the first Party plenum in April 1989,
after the Congress of People’s Deputies elections. Many of these members had been
convinced to resign rather than lose their seats in the next general election to be held in
1991. At the time, these changes were significant to the advancement of reform because
they allowed Gorbachev to remove some of the “conservative dead weight” and
opponents of reform from key Party institutions.
Unlike Alexander II, who was able to pass reforms with little difficulty because
he held absolute power, Gorbachev was chained to the Politburo. Without the
consolidation of political support, Gorbachev would never have been able to propose and
execute his reforms, much less attempt to reform the political system itself. For this
reason, Gorbachev had to play quite a large role in the reform of the Soviet political
system, as he constantly needed to maneuver, appease, and compromise in order to
remain in power and maintain support for the reforms.

Reform of the Political System: Consequences/Implementation
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The election of March 1989 “marked an irreversible step in the evolution of
perestroika as politics entered the streets and popular consciousness.”323 The enthusiasm
for and participation in these first semi-free elections in the Soviet Union “testified to the
passions that had been kept muzzled for so long.” Despite the fact that the elections took
place within a one-party system and about 85-87 percent of candidates were Party
members, citizens finally had a real choice among “different candidates in terms of their
policies and principles.”324 For the first time, instead of being silent spectators in the
political arena, the people could voice their opinions and participate in politics.
An unintended consequence of allowing elections with choice, coupled with the
opportunity for citizens to nominate candidates from outside the party apparatus, was a
shift in the “occupational and class composition of the Congress of People’s Deputies as
compared with that of its predecessor, the unreformed Supreme Soviet ‘elected’ in
1984.”325 The percentage of workers in the Congress dropped from 49.5 percent to 23.1
percent and representatives of intellectuals and higher education rose. In particular, heads
of universities, who had had no representation in the 1984 Supreme Soviet, made up 4.1
percent of the 1989 Congress. New occupations like lawyers and journalists appeared for
the first time, while representation for other groups, such as senior KGB officials,
dropped.326 This diversification the Congress of People’s Deputies demonstrated an
important shift away from the Party and Party organizations.
The reorganization of the Central Committee, particularly the changes in the
economic departments in October 1988, was critical if Gorbachev’s economic reforms
323
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were to succeed. The elimination of eleven of twenty departments in charge of oversight
and intervention in different aspects of the economy, such as consumer goods, meant that
enterprises would be able to proceed with an unprecedented amount of freedom, at least
when compared with the level of scrutiny and control previously imposed.327 The Central
Committee’s reorganization, particularly in its economic departments, was intended to
“withdraw the Party from detailed economic tutelage.”328 The abolition of many
departments whose sole purpose was “to supervise economic ministries and to intervene
in economic decision-making [was] evidence of a new degree of seriousness of that
intent.”329

Gorbachev’s Reforms: Implementation and Consequences
The effects of the reforms were varied and included many unintended
consequences. The major impact of glasnost was the development of free speech and a
free press. Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television were “uncovering and handling
new topics,” and generally the press was given more freedom.330 Public opinion was “no
longer cowed by fear,” and became “a force in its own right.”331 However, glasnost also
created a constant battle between the public and the authorities, as the public sought to
extend the bounds of the “permissible.” “Half glasnost” meant that eventually either “full
freedom” or a controlled “freedom” of the press and information would be needed.
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Despite this battle between the public and the authorities, open discussion “by an
awakened society” was widely encouraged as necessary for a reformed society and
government. Unfortunately for Gorbachev, people began to look outside the communist
system for answers.
Perestroika was not successful, at least in terms of modernizing the economy
while remaining communist, and life became more difficult for many Soviet citizens.332
Economic reform advanced very slowly, not only facing bureaucratic obstructionism
from within, but also dealing with contradictions between the reforms and the structure of
the existing systems. Just as Alexander II’s new institutions struggled to exist side by side
with institutions remaining from his father’s reign, Gorbachev’s reforms often struggled
with decades old Soviet structures. For example, the new institutions uneasily coexisted
with ministries that had almost identical function, thus leading to a struggle for survival.
The economy itself was in limbo, caught between an odd mixture of command and
market economies that pleased no one.
Though Gorbachev had hoped to institute reforms while retaining Soviet-style
communism, it became clear to many that eventually a full transformation into a market
economy would be required. The instability and chaos perestroika unleashed on the
economy and on society in general created massive discontent and civil unrest.
According to Soviet statistics, between January 1988 and November 1989,300 people
were killed, more than 5,000 injured and 360,000 “forced to flee their homes because of
pogroms, riots, and intercommunal clashes.”333 Other consequences included worker
strikes, most notably multiple rounds of miner strikes as economic conditions worsened.
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In late 1989, strikers demanded Gorbachev’s resignation and the “removal of Communist
Party organizations from the workplace.”334 Not only did the strikes demonstrate general
dissatisfaction with the economy among workers and the general population, but also
demonstrated growing anti-communist sentiment. In fact, in 1990 the Cabinet of
Ministers “called a ban on demonstrations in Moscow from 26 March to 15 April.”335 The
ban, which Gorbachev approved, ended up being ineffective, as Yeltsin called a
demonstration for March 28 in which over a 250,000 people participated. This
demonstrated that the government, and especially Gorbachev, could not enforce the ban,
probably from fear of political backlash due to his own reduced power.
Reform of the legal system in the Soviet Union started to create a new sense of
rule of law, “rather than bureaucratic whim,” which subjected the Communist Party to the
rule of law and “mov[ed] supreme power from Party to state institutions.”336 This meant
that the Party was no longer legally untouchable; Gorbachev hoped his reforms would
increase accountability for the Party and the government. Religious and political
freedoms also “were to be guaranteed by the new constitution.”337 In terms of political
and electoral reform, “democratization” and liberalization began to emerge, demonstrated
by the competitive elections. Gorbachev “played a key role in introducing political
pluralism and a whole range of freedoms,” which upset “a system whose longevity had
depended on its vigilance in combating manifestations of group autonomy or of political,
intellectual, artistic, and religious liberty.”338 His reforms undermined the Party structure
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and power, thereby undermining “his own power and authority.”339 Consequently, the
unintended consequences of Gorbachev’s reforms threatened not only his political power,
but also the continued existence of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev had hoped his reforms would activate society, and in this respect he
succeeded. Millions of Soviet citizens were actively participating “in open and
contentious public life,” as a “culture of democracy began to replace the climate of fear,”
and a civil society was born. The elections in spring 1989 and the local elections in 1990
“marked a watershed” moment in Soviet history, and confirmed the rebirth and
rejuvenation of “an active citizenry.”340

Why did Gorbachev’s reforms fail?/end of the USSR
Gorbachev’s reforms, like Alexander II’s, were intended to move the country
forward, but instead threatened the power of both government and ruler. Though
Gorbachev’s hopes of activating society succeeded, his main rationale for launching the
reforms was to modernize the country and improve the economy while remaining
“communist.” Given that the reforms led directly to the dissolution of the USSR,
Gorbachev clearly failed in at least one respect.
One of the major obstacles to reform was the opposition Gorbachev faced from
all sides. Opposition to Gorbachev and his plans led to significant compromises, which
pleased no one, as had been the case for Alexander II. Ordinary citizens immediately felt
the consequences of these changes in their everyday lives; as examples, the anti-alcohol
campaign “served to alienate many,” and the anti-corruption campaign “closed various
339
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channels by which the bureaucratic system could be circumvented.”341 Standards of living
did not improve, and “in material terms, [life] became harder for the majority of Soviet
people.”342 The transition to a partially mixed market economy was especially difficult
for every-day Soviet citizens, because not only did it mean “harder work and higher
prices,” but unemployment was also introduced into the system.343
The reforms angered the bureaucracy, which Gorbachev constantly criticized and
also purged. Party bureaucrats were often the targets in political reform legislation as well
as in anti-corruption speeches. Using the language of class revolution against what
Gorbachev’s supporters called the “‘exploiter class’ of functionaries in party, state, and
industry,” became a form of “controlled coup against the bureaucracy and ultimately
against the Party apparatus itself.”344 By excising sections of the Party apparatus in an
attempt to reduce corruption, increase efficiency, and modernize the Party with a new
generation of reformers, Gorbachev undermined his own position. The Party apparatus
was the basis for his power, so his fight against corruption, bureaucracy, and Soviet
“tradition” was likely to result in his removal or worse.
Communist Party conservatives “objected to liberalizing economic laws” and
other forms of market characteristics on “ideological grounds.”345 Gorbachev’s arguments
in favor of market competition, and salaries based on skills and production standards,
suggested a move toward capitalism. Therefore, Party hardliners argued that the
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perestroika was capitalism with a “socialist face.”346 Gorbachev later sought to appease
them, but it was too late.
This became clear on August 18, 1991 when a small group of Party hardliners,
including Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, General Valentin Varennikov, Minister of
Defense Dmitry Yazov, and Gorbachev’s Chief of Staff Valery Boldin, attempted to oust
Gorbachev.347 These men detained Gorbachev and his family in his offices in the vacation
town of Foros in Crimea. While he was in detention, they tried to intimidate him into
declaring emergency rule, which implied a return to “repressive measures to restore
‘order.’”348 When their attempts to force Gorbachev to declare emergency rule were
unsuccessful, they tried to force him to resign, but he refused, and the coup failed four
days later. Yeltsin exploited the August coup to enhance his own prestige; he had been in
“contact with world leaders during Gorbachev’s detention.”349 Though Gorbachev still
retained power on paper, the coup was a blow from which he would never recover. At
this point Gorbachev’s former liberal supporters defected to Yeltsin, so he turned to Party
conservatives in a fruitless effort to find support. However, “Gorbachev failed to realize”
that this faction had either endorsed the coup or had done nothing to prevent it. The Party
had now lost “what had been left of its credibility.”350
As the union republics sped towards secession in fall of 1991, Gorbachev and the
Communist Party continued to lose authority at a rapid rate. The 1989 Law on Baltic
Economic Independence gave Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia “broad powers to manage
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resources, [the] economy, finance, and set budgets,” a major step towards full
independence.”351 Their independence was officially recognized on September 6, 1991;
“four days later Armenia declared its independence,” and Moldova and Georgia “already
considered themselves to be independent.”352 The “final blow” to the Soviet Union was
the meeting on December 8, 1991 between Yeltsin and the presidents of Belorussia and
Ukraine (without Gorbachev’s knowledge), where they announced “the Soviet Union was
ceasing to exist.”353 They began a transition to what they called a “Commonwealth of
Independent States.” Finally, on December 25, 1991 Gorbachev officially resigned,
handing his power over to Yeltsin, as the Russian Federation became the official
successor state to the USSR.
Glasnost, perestroika, and Gorbachev’s other reforms all helped to activate
society, as well as highlight the many serious problems (particularly economic problems)
that required radical reforms beyond Gorbachev’s original plan. Glasnost allowed Soviet
citizens to speak out, which led to the popular demand for an end to Party rule. In
Russia, Yeltsin seemed to embody their hopes for meaningful change. Seventy-four years
after the Bolshevik Revolution, it took only seven years of Gorbachev’s rule to bring
about the end of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent states from the union
republics.
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Conclusion

Alexander II’s and Gorbachev’s efforts to implement major reforms while
maintaining their political authority illustrate Alexis de Tocqueville’s aphorism that “the
most dangerous moment for a bad government is when it decides to reform”354 very well.
When Alexander ascended the throne in the middle of the Crimean War, the Russian
Empire was on the brink disaster: a looming financial crisis, a weak and humiliated
military, repressive censorship, rigid social and economic stratification, which included
millions of enserfed peasants. When Gorbachev was elected the General Secretary of the
CPSU in 1985, the Soviet Union suffered from a stagnant economy, a passive and
disillusioned population, unsustainable military spending, and a repressive, hypercentralized one-party state. Both men were determined to reform their respective “bad
governments,” but as de Tocqueville suggested, their reforms caused chaos, instability,
and “dangerous” threats to their personal power and authority that ended in assassination
for Alexander and the collapse of a once powerful communist empire for Gorbachev.
The tripartite support of autocratic power in imperial Russia came from the
Church, the nobility, and serfdom. These began to fray in the 18th century as Peter I
abolished the Patriarchate to fold the Church into the state. Catherine II cut the ties of the
nobility to the state through her 1785 charter, freeing them from state service. Serfdom,
the remaining pillar, was abolished by Alexander II’s landed Emancipation. As discussed
above, the Emancipation, coupled with the other Great Reforms, led to major social
turmoil, spawned revolutionary movements, and undermined the autocracy.
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Gorbachev’s power derived from communist ideology, the primacy of the Party,
the Soviet Union’s status as a superpower, and hypercentralization. Although Gorbachev
correctly realized that Soviet military spending was unsustainable in the context of the
faltering economy and, cut the military budget, he made powerful enemies. Perestroika
and glasnost undermined the Party by attempting to democratize it. Similarly,
Gorbachev’s insistence on questioning everything made him “weak” in the minds of most
Soviet citizens.
Both Alexander II and Gorbachev had also hoped to activate society through their
reforms and “encourage the development of a vigorous civil society as the basis for a
viable state and an effective economic system.”355 For example, Alexander and
Gorbachev intended censorship reform to promote critical thinking and make the
government more transparent than it had ever been. Under both leaders, censorship
reform succeeded in activating society, but also in creating unintended consequences;
through increased discussion and political awareness came not only instability, but a real
threat to the power of the ruler as the people had a little taste of freedom and began
demanding more. Both had hoped relaxed censorship and increased transparency would
develop between the public and the government. Instead, these changes fueled discontent
as people started to realize what they had been missing and began demanding more.
Both leaders also wanted to reform their country to become economically (and
agriculturally) prosperous, but more importantly, they wanted to reform and rapidly.
Despite their good intentions, it proved almost impossible for a “bad government” to
reform itself, let alone rapidly, without threatening the power and existence of the regime.
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Alexander had no intention of weakening his own autocratic power, just as Gorbachev
had no intention of ending communism in the USSR. They both sought to solve without
fundamentally changing their respective political systems.
While it may always be chaotic when a “bad government” attempts to reform
itself, Alexander II’s and Gorbachev’s consistent efforts to compromise with their
opponents during the reform process only worsened an already unstable situation. In
both case these compromises either the conservatives or the liberals in their country.
Under Alexander II, the People’s Will and other revolutionary groups felt he was moving
too slowly with the reform process, while his nobles felt he was moving too quickly.
Gorbachev was facing a similar dilemma, with so-called liberal reformers like Yeltsin
attacking him for moving too slowly, while Party conservatives foresaw that the reforms
threatened communism. The outcomes in both cases demonstrate the problems of trying
to please all parties when a country is dealing with major problems or on the verge of
severe crisis.
While Alexander tried to appease the peasants, the liberal intelligentsia, and the
nobility, Gorbachev tried to appease the people, the Party, and the liberal intellectuals.
Unfortunately, these groups were so far apart that it was impossible to bridge the divide
quickly. Alexander’s and Gorbachev’s experiences demonstrate extreme difficulty of
moderating and successfully implementing change in a time of crisis. Moderate reforms
work only when a country is stable, united, and thriving. In Russiam compromise
inflamed an already poor situation, angering all sides and fanning the flames of rebellion.
Of course, the differences between Alexander II’s and Gorbachev’s situations
cannot be overlooked. Alexander was tsar in an autocracy, holding total power (in theory,
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at least); furthermore, he and the peasants believed the autocracy to be divinely ordained,
a gift from God to the Romanovs. Gorbachev’s power, on the other hand, depended on
support with the leadership ranks of the Communist Party. Therefore, unlike Alexander,
Gorbachev needed to tread lightly in all aspects of his reforms, because if he lost the
support of other Party leaders on the Politburo and the Central Committee, he would be
ousted (an issue Alexander did not have to consider). Gorbachev’s failure to implement
his reforms fully did not reflect lack of commitment on his part, but rather, the political
minefield he faced: too many wrong steps, and he was out.
Alexander II and his reform-minded advisers and ministers were able to
implement their reform programs without oversight (with the exception of the abolition
of serfdom). Not only did Gorbachev have to answer to the Party, glasnost meant that he
also had to respond to the Soviet people. For example, when Alexander II’s Minister of
War implemented his military reform program, he did not have to worry about public
reaction as long as he had the tsar’s support. The only exception was the Emancipation.
How useful, then, is this comparison? The massive instability that ensued as a
result of their reforms was similar, and despite the differences in their circumstances,
both reform periods support de Tocqueville’s about reforming bad governments very
well. Were Alexander and Gorbachev “doomed,” as my title somewhat ironically
suggests? Historians reject “predestination,” but given Russia’s long history of resistance
to political change, they both faced major cultural impediments to their reforms from the
outset. As Russia’s history demonstrates, Russians not only resist change, if that change
seems to come from the West, they are particularly resistant. Authoritarian rule has been
the norm. In 1613, for example, when Russia’s future was debated at the zemskii sobor

95
(estates general) held at the end of the Time of Troubles, the representative elected
Mikhail Romanov tsar with full autocratic powers because the Troubles had shown them
the dangers of noble oligarchic rule. However, when Peter I used his absolute power to
“westernize” Russia, the people rebelled. After the autocracy was toppled in 1917, the
power vacuum led to the Bolsheviks’ rise to power, with Lenin as the authority figure.
Even after Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s attempts to destalinize, many Russians
preferred a Stalin to the bumbling Khrushchev. One of Gorbachev’s many problems is
that his tendency to compromise made him appear “weak” in the eyes of the populace.
And certainly Putin’s meteoric rise in the last years of Yeltsin’s disastrous “democratic”
reign, reinforces the cultural preference for a “strong” leader. If Alexander II and
Gorbachev were not inevitably doomed to failure, Russia’s historical resistance to change
combined with the inherent danger of a “bad government” reforming itself made their
demise highly likely. The odds were against them.
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